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Queering Religion and Nature
Religion is much queerer than we ever imagined. Nature is as 
well. These are the two basic insights that have led to this book: 
we hope to queerly go where no thinkers have gone before. The 
combination of queer theory and religion has been happening 
for at least 25 years. People such as John Boswell began to exam-
ine the history of religious traditions with a queer eye, and soon 
after we had the indecent theology of Marcella Althaus Ried. Jay 
Johnston, one of the authors in this volume, is among those who 
have used the queer eye to interrogate authority within Chris-
tian theological traditions. At the same time, interrogating na-
ture from a queer perspective has begun, perhaps most notably 
in the work of Joan Roughgarden’s Evolution’s Rainbow and with 
the works of Anne Fausto-Sterling. However, the intersections 
of religion, nature, and queer theory have largely been left un-
touched. With the exception of Dan Spencer, the author of the 
Introduction for this volume and one of the early pioneers in 
this realm of thought with his book Gay and Gaia, and Greta 
Gaard, whose work is developing a queer ecofeminist thought, 
authors have largely ignored religion and nature or religion and 
ecology in the realm of queer theory. 
In part, the blinders to queer theory on the part of eco-think-
ers (religious or otherwise) are the same as the blinders eco-
thinkers have when it comes to postmodern thought in general: 
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namely, if there are no foundations, how does one create an 
environmental ethic or a “nature” to save? Do we really have 
time to be dealing with all of these theoretical issues when the 
earth is in the midst of the sixth mass extinction and a rapidly 
changing climate? Obviously, the authors in this volume think 
it is important and that these questions need new responses and 
thoughts unprecedented in comparison to previous ones. In 
broad strokes, the authors agree that queer theory has some-
thing to tell us about how to live to achieve a better planetary 
future. 
For this reason and many others, the current volume on re-
ligion, nature, and queer theory is quite groundbreaking. Carol 
Wayne White starts us off with the issue of race, religion, and 
queer theory and how together they might help to develop an 
African-American Religious Naturalism. Jake Erickson’s piece 
provides us with a fascinating combination of Isabella Rossel-
lini’s “Green Porno” and Martin Luther’s thought in order to 
develop an indecent theology. Continuing on the theological 
theme, Jay Johnston’s “Master and Pup” helps to open up the 
imago Dei (or what it means to be “made in the image of God”) 
to the more-than-human world and to rethink theologically 
the status of non-human animals. My own chapter attempts to 
look at climate change, globalization, and queer theory as the 
grounds for new possibilities for planetary becoming. And fi-
nally, eco-critic Timothy Morton, whose seminal essay “Queer 
Ecology” is so important for these intersections of thought, de-
velops a critique of “agrologistics” in dialogue with queer theory 
and postmodern thought. 
Though these essays span many different disciplines and 
themes, they are all held together by the triple focus on religion, 
nature, and queer theory. Some focus more on one of those loci 
than the others, but all of them at least mix with each of them. 
They can be read in order, out of order, together, or as individ-
ual reflections. There is no right or wrong way to engage with 
the chapters in this book, but hopefully engaging with them in 
some way will help inspire new ways of thinking about (and per-
haps even becoming in) the world for you, just as they have for 
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me. Without being too ambitious, I hope that these essays help 
to open up a whole new trajectory of conversation at the inter-
section of religion, nature, and queer theory. 
As with all books, this one too only appears as a result of a lot 
of work both seen and unseen. In addition to the countless activ-
ists and academicians who have come before us, paving the way 
for such a volume, I’d like to thank a few groups of people more 
specifically. First and foremost, I’d like to thank the authors of 
this volume for seeing the project through to publication. Sec-
ondly, I’d like to thank my colleagues and friends at Florida In-
ternational University, at the Religion and Ecology Group of the 
American Academy of Religion, at the Forum on Religion and 
Ecology, and at the International Society for the Study of Re-
ligion, Nature and Culture. Without the fruitful conversations 
that have happened in these spaces this volume would not have 
emerged. Third, I want to thank the anonymous reviewers of 
earlier versions of these chapters; without their critical insights 
these essays would not be as complete as they are. Fourth and 
finally, I’d like to thank the editorial team at punctum books for 
taking an interest in this volume and seeing it through to pub-
lication. 




Religion, Nature,  
and Queer Theory
Daniel T. Spencer
In 1989 I began doctoral work at Union Theological Seminary 
to integrate insights from ecology, liberation theologies, and 
ecofeminism — what eventually emerged was my book, Gay and 
Gaia: Ethics, Ecology and the Erotic. I now welcome this oppor-
tunity to look back at how the emerging intersections among 
religion, nature, culture, and sexuality in the 1980s and 1990s 
shaped those reflections, and to look forward to the insights of a 
new generation of queer scholars of religion.
Trained as a geologist who came late to theology and ethics, 
my intuitions about this intersection began to form in college 
when I studied volcanoes in Costa Rica in 1978 as a deeply clos-
eted gay man. Here I was exposed to human rights issues and 
poverty, exacerbated by the many civil wars engulfing Costa Ri-
ca’s neighbors. I first enrolled at Union in 1980 to try to address 
the many theoethical issues that my time in Central America 
and my closeted sexuality were raising, having little inclination 
then how deeply intertwined the answers would become. Hav-
ing recently come out to family and friends, I returned to Costa 
Rica in 1982 to study liberation theology. I spent my weekends 
working with refugee children from El Salvador, displaced from 
their homelands by the combination of military violence and 
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ecological degradation from the scorched earth tactics of us-
sponsored counterinsurgency tactics. Coming to terms with my 
own gay identity has therefore always been deeply intertwined 
with my love of the earth and its diverse ecosystems and my 
commitment to social justice for the poor and exploited.
Gay and Gaia was my effort to integrate the insights of ecology 
and environmental ethics with liberation theologies — particu-
larly gay and lesbian, black, Latin American, and feminist — and 
ecofeminism. I was largely unexposed to the emerging field of 
queer theory at this time; Robert Goss’s important book, Jesus 
Acted Up: A Gay and Lesbian Manifesto, came out in 1993 and be-
gan the important work of integrating queer insights with theol-
ogy but did not address ecology and environmental concerns so 
central to my own commitments. I was more influenced by the 
pioneering work in gay theology of my friend J. Michael Clark, 
whose prophetic A Place to Start: Toward an Unapologetic Gay 
Liberation Theology appeared in 1989 just as I began my doctoral 
studies. By 1993 Clark had published Beyond Our Ghettos: Gay 
Theology in Ecological Perspective, the first work I know of to try 
to articulate a “gay ecotheological paradigm.” Deeply influenced 
by the ecosocial crisis of HIV/AIDS, Clark’s work remains for me 
some of the most prophetic and profound reflections on the in-
tersections of religion, nature and queer theory.
In Gay and Gaia I tried to address several issues. Convinced 
of a profound “sense of the sacred found in the interconnect-
edness of all,” I sought to shift the grounding for ethics from 
“an anthropocentric, human-centered worldview” to an “eco-
centric, all-of-life centered worldview.” Methodologically I was 
convinced that ecology, liberation theologies, and ecofeminism 
all had critical insights to building an ethic of sustainability that 
could integrate all levels of our lives, from our most intimate 
relationships (“Gay”) to the planetary (“Gaia”). Key to this was 
reclaiming eros as the life-force of attraction that informs all our 
relations, and I argued that gay and lesbian experience and the-
ory make critical contributions for how to do this. As a way to 
locate this work conceptually, I coined the concept of “ecological 
location,” enlarging the concept of social location
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to include both where human beings are located within hu-
man society and within the broader biotic community, as 
well as conceiving other members of the biotic community 
and the biotic community itself as locatable active agents that 
historically interact with and shape the other members of the 
ecological community, including human beings (Spencer 
1996: 295–96).
Without the explicit theoretical tools that would emerge in 
queer theory, I intuited that key to this project would be de-
constructing rigid dualistic and binary constructs that informed 
theological notions of God, nature, and humanity, and the rela-
tionship (or lack thereof) among them.
Since writing Gay and Gaia, two other sets of experiences 
have strongly shaped my thinking on these issues. In 1993 I 
started teaching as an openly gay religion professor at Drake 
University, helping undergraduates negotiate the perils of com-
ing out while they explored queering their identities. Struck by 
the overwhelming whiteness of Iowa in contrast to its Native 
American histories and origins, I examined the reality and con-
struct of race through the lenses of ecological location and the 
settlement history of Iowa to conceptualize race as an ecological 
construct. It embeds within it a racialized history of interacting 
with the natural world that reflects the dynamics of historical 
racism and exploitation.1 It is thus a particular delight to read 
Carol Wayne White’s essay here on James Baldwin and con-
structing a queer African-American religious naturalism.
In 2000, I moved to Montana and later joined the Environ-
mental Studies program at the University of Montana where I 
shifted my teaching and research to ethical issues of globaliza-
tion and ecological restoration while retaining a liberationist 
commitment. This shift in my own ecological location has sensi-
1 This in turn informs part of my current work of reconceiving the practice of 
ecological restoration as one of ecological reparations to address the paired 




tized me to important connections in queer theory and emerging 
trends in postmodern thought — particularly destabilizing and 
deconstructing fixed categories undergirding modernity with 
ecological perspectives. The impact of chaos theory on ecology, 
the emergence of hybrid and novel ecosystems that increasingly 
make up our postmodern ecological locations, the destabilizing 
impacts of climate change, and the shift in ecological restoration 
from trying to restore to the past to restoring damaged ecosys-
tems to multiple possible future trajectories — all suggest prom-
ising and important intersections between religion, nature, and 
queer theory. Within this framework, I am currently exploring 
a shift from a more static ethics of sustainability that informed 
Gay and Gaia to a more dynamic restorative paradigm that hon-
ors human and more-than-human agencies and its ecosocial 
implications for living well in the Anthropocene.
The essays in this book push our reflections and praxis at the 
intersection of religion, nature, and queer theory in important 
and exciting ways. The genius of these chapters is that once read, 
we can never look at or think about the subjects of each in quite 
the same way — queer(y)ing opens up new and transformative 
possibilities, so critical in the perilous times of the Anthropo-
cene. While each essay makes its own distinctive contribution, 
the queer notion of “performativity” links them in several ways.
Carol Wayne White examines ecosystems of queer affection 
in the writings of James Baldwin to ground an emerging Afri-
can-American religious naturalism. Baldwin coined metaphors 
of “bastard” and “freak” to “illuminate the complicated intersec-
tions of queerness, blackness, and religious rhetoric” in order to 
expose and undermine white supremacy that “established white 
male heterosexuality as the norm for ascertaining and evaluat-
ing other expressions of desire.” Against the fixed binaries that 
both white supremacy and traditional Black church religiosity 
use to police queer desire, White draws “the contours of a queer 
African-American religious topography where polyamorous 
bastards roam ecstatically in nomadic desiring.” This “pleasura-
ble ‘roaming’ of a queer love” in turn “celebrates humans’ radical 
relationality with each other, and, with other natural processes,” 
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revealing our common humanity as an ongoing task that we 
construct rather than a fixed essence we discover. 
Jacob Erickson takes “a constructive posture of irreverence” 
to destabilize the concepts of “God” and “Nature” in contempo-
rary ecotheology. Queering Martin Luther’s view of incarnation, 
Erickson “offers the potential for a queer incarnation of divin-
ity in which that divinity is caught up — and even plays several 
roles — in the performative indeterminacy of the earth and of 
the cosmos.” From this irreverent and playful queerying of sa-
cred notions, “divinity becomes a ‘queer critter’ seducing other 
queer critters’ disturbing loves and ever-new responsibilities.” 
All theology is thus both irreverent and queer: “Our language, 
speaking of God and creation, is carnivalesque, topsy-turvy, 
performative, animated, vibrant, constantly changing shape and 
drag.” 
Jay Johnson’s reflection emerges from a multi-year relation-
ship with his dog, Tyler, who helps him to realize that queer 
theorizing can move beyond critical interrogation of gender 
and sexuality “to humanity’s deeply contested relationship with 
other animals.” Blurring lines between human and dog, master 
and pet, he examines the multiple performativities in ecosys-
tems of gay affection and particularly the human-pup-play phe-
nomenon in some sectors of gay life. In a recent ‘pupumentary,’ 
Master Skip and Pup Tim perform other-than-human behaviors 
and roles to blur the human-animal binary and open up possi-
bilities of “cultivating inter-species relationships of empathy and 
intimacy.” Johnson reflects on their experience to deconstruct 
rigid anthropocentric doctrines of the imago Dei that allow 
Christians to ignore critical issues of “evolutionary theodicy” 
and the pervasiveness of suffering throughout the animal world.
Whitney Bauman draws on queer theory to engage new pos-
sibilities of performance that decenter anthropocentrism and 
open up ways to re-engage with/on/in the planet by respecting 
its agency at multiple levels. Connecting with my own work on 
the twin “wicked problems” of globalization and climate change, 
Bauman skillfully “queers the planet” to enable us to “break out 
of the thought habits of modern scientific reduction” and “the 
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habits of becoming according to the laws of capitalist reproduc-
tion.” Becoming versatile in planetary ethics requires reflexive 
positioning to discern “the contexts and contours of our plan-
etary becoming.”
Timothy Morton begins his essay by queering the “law of 
noncontradiction” that permeates western thought dating at 
least to Aristotle through the notion of performativity where 
phenomena simultaneously and paradoxically are and are not 
what they seem. He undermines the rigid “agrilogistics” and the 
persistent acts of violence needed to maintain it that emerged 
in the Neolithic and continue to structure society in the mod-
ern era. In contrast, queer green thinking and acting subverts 
agrilogistics, as do “the uncontainable enjoyment” of queer sex 
and the playfulness of toys, opening up vital new possibilities for 
our time. Hence, “thinking ecologically precisely means think-
ing that things are queer green toys” that can move us past the 
violent binaries continuously policed and enforced to maintain 
the [now globalized] structures of agrilogistics.
I hope these diverse essays queer your imagination and open 
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Polyamorous Bastards:  
James Baldwin’s Opening  
to a Queer African-American 
Religious Naturalism
Carol Wayne White
Love takes off masks that we fear we cannot live 
without and know we cannot live within. 
 — James Baldwin
At the height of the civil rights era in the twentieth century, 
James Baldwin poignantly described blacks’ experiences of 
marginality in North America. In a country besieged by white 
supremacy, he tried to capture the acute sense of displacement 
felt by African Americans with the creative use of the “bastard” 
epithet. In doing so, he drew richly from formative familial ex-
periences and the black holiness tradition of his youth. Having 
never known his biological father and feeling estranged from his 
emotionally distant stepfather — a factory worker and storefront 
preacher whom his mother married when he was three — Bald-
win would later write about the anguish of experiencing life as 
an “illegitimate” kid. In both acclaimed novels and critical es-
says, he creatively used the bastard motif to augment a critical 
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self-awareness associated with being the outsider and the ille-
gitimate other. 
Conjoining the personal and the political, Baldwin rhetori-
cally expanded the term bastard to convey blacks’ harried ex-
istence in the “New World” and to evoke an ethical quandary 
for white Americans. In the absence of embodied authenticity 
and relational integrity, Baldwin’s bastard metaphor revealed 
the pathology inherent in many whites’ refusal to embrace their 
familial kinship with blacks. With this term, Baldwin also raised 
a critical question to the America of his day: whether hope for 
its future could possibly exist in light of distorted forms of rela-
tionality. Baldwin’s very use of the bastard term symbolized the 
moral paralysis he saw embedded in an American psyche suffer-
ing from a great lie perpetuated by white supremacy.
Baldwin’s use of the bastard metaphor has elicited a range 
of critical responses, from Cornel West’s distrust of a perceived 
apolitical individualism to Clarence Hardy’s declaration that 
Baldwin was poignantly seeking recognition from whites (West 
1982; Hardy 2003, 105). However, I consider Baldwin’s use of it as 
part of a complex ontological project with monumental social, 
affective, and ethical implications. With the bastard motif, Bald-
win also underscored impoverished views of humanity kept in 
place by polarized, binary constructions (e.g., white/black, in-
sider/outsider, superiority/inferiority, the saved/damned, hete-
ro-normative/homo-depraved beings). 
In an attempt to address these various forms of alienation 
experienced by Americans desiring profound connection with 
otherness, Baldwin introduced the concept of love. Far from be-
ing a lofty abstraction, Baldwin’s conception of love entailed a 
radical re-adjustment of human relations, requiring individu-
als and communities to embrace others they often feared, dis-
missed, or even hated. This specific form of love demanded from 
whites and blacks unprecedented acts of courage and audacious 
choices. Accordingly, his view of love was a creative means of 




In this chapter, I explore the rich conceptual space opened 
by Baldwin’s use of the bastard metaphor and his ensuing con-
cept of love. In describing Baldwin’s usage of this term, I focus 
primarily on cultural critiques found in his critical essays; I also 
use Baldwin’s writings as an opening for articulating my fuller 
explication of queer religious naturalism. Inspired by his crea-
tive reach, I thus specify bastard as a trope to mark the emer-
gence of an African-American religious naturalism that resists 
normative (and, in my rendering, impoverished) views of our 
humanity. Specifically, in negating pauperized views of blacks’ 
humanity perpetuated by white supremacy, this African-Ameri-
can religious naturalism invites contemporary readers to recon-
sider who and what we are: value-laden natural processes that 
become human in specific orientations. It presupposes human 
animals’ deep, inextricable homology with each other, draw-
ing our attention to an expansive view of our humanity as an 
emergent phenomenon, not an achievement. Further, in un-
derscoring humans’ inexhaustible connection or entanglement 
with other natural processes, this naturalistic view also brings to 
light our essential connection with the more-than-human that 
constitutes the very notion of the human as such.1 
Further, building on a notion of love that I glean from Bald-
win’s self-understanding as an (sexualized) outsider, my view 
of religiosity celebrates nomadic, polyamorous relations. With 
its naturalistic grounding, this model of religiosity resists the 
“isms” based on binary constructions that uphold asymmetri-
cal relationships and polarize our desire for connection with all 
1 Utilizing the tenets of religious naturalism in conjunction with values dis-
course, I consider humans’ awareness and appreciation of our connection 
to “all that is” as an expression of what we perceive as ultimately important 
and valuable. Since religious naturalism does not use “supernatural” con-
cepts or theories in comprehending humans’ need for value and meaning, 
the realm of nature is the focus (this includes both natural processes and 
human culture for most religious naturalists). Religious naturalists draw 
on two fundamental convictions in understanding basic human quests for 
meaning and value: the sense of Nature’s richness, spectacular complexity, 
and fertility, and the recognition that Nature is the only realm in which 
people live out their lives. 
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that is. In so doing, this African-American religious naturalism 
adopts a queer positionality — or what Michael Warner has de-
scribed as resistance “to regimes of the normal” (Warner 1993, 
xxvii). As queer enactment, this African-American religiosity 
calls for a radical relationality in which our experiences of love 
overcome arbitrary boundaries held in place by normalizing 
cultural markers. It seeks a modality of existence based in trans-
formation; in such a vision, our expanded humanity as sentient 
beings is porous — we suffuse each other with care and a sense 
of belonging together. 
To advance my argument, I first introduce Baldwin’s cultural 
critiques that gave rise to the bastard motif and discuss his crea-
tive use of the term in specific contexts. These brief discussions 
serve as an opening to my fuller explorations of the term in a 
queer religious context. I then highlight Baldwin’s rejection of 
a model of Christianity that gloried a depraved blackness with 
its theistic symbolism of a white God. Of key importance here 
are Baldwin’s warnings against investing in a religious vision 
that implicitly kept in place white racist constructs, problematic 
cultural practices, and heteronormative values. Following this, I 
discuss Baldwin’s concept of embodied love, which he viewed as 
a corrective to the normative religious system. Finally, I explore 
the possibility of a queer African-American religious natural-
ism that advances Baldwin’s notion of enacting boundless love 
with each other. Given the historical gap between Baldwin’s and 
our own time, I attempt to sketch a capacious model of African-
American religiosity that he was unable to conceive at that time. 
In order to distinguish this religious perspective as queer enact-
ment, I incorporate insights from Claudia Schippert’s strategy 
of queering the religious discipline. My goal is to draw the con-
tours of a queer African-American religious topography where 
polyamorous bastards roam ecstatically in nomadic desiring. 
Baldwin’s Bastards: Illicit Race and Nomadic Sensibilities 
Baldwin emerged as an essayist in the fifties when the civil-rights 
movement was barely in discernible form. In his first collec-
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tion of essays, Notes of a Native Son (1955), followed by Nobody 
Knows My Name (1961) and The Fire Next Time (1963), Baldwin 
introduced a style of writing that fused in a unique fashion the 
personal, the political, and the literary. Whether recounting his 
experiences as a teenage preacher, a queer male, a black expatri-
ate, a public intellectual, or an activist in the struggle for civil 
rights, Baldwin wrote passionately about the quandaries of liv-
ing life as an outlier.2 He brought an intense self-awareness to 
his inhabiting within one body many different (and often ex-
cluded) cultural markers. 
In the America of his day, these identities were persistently 
viewed as oppositional: his blackness and erotic-affective de-
sires; his precocious religious insights and radical activism; his 
designation as a black American artist in Europe juxtaposed 
with his European celebrity in white America. In his quest to 
create an authentic mode of existence, however, Baldwin resist-
ed, with varying degrees of success, the easy option of reducing 
his capacious humanity to any single identity. Furthermore, he 
creatively expanded this sensibility to include the collective ex-
periences of African Americans as he sought new ways of being 
in which he and others could live fully with perceived differ-
ences (White 2016, 95). 
In their introduction to a critical collection of essays on Bald-
win, Cora Kaplan and Bill Schwartz described a dominant trend 
in Baldwin studies that often failed to understand this point. 
As they observed: “For too long one Baldwin has been pitted 
against another Baldwin, producing a series of polarities that 
has skewed our understanding: his art against his politics, his 
fiction against his nonfiction; his early writings against his late 
writings; American Baldwin against European Baldwin; black 
Baldwin against queer Baldwin” (Kaplan and Schwartz 2011, 3). 
I share this robust reading of Baldwin. Select essays show Bald-
win resisting facile, externally imposed views of his humanity, as 
2 Parts of this discussion are adapted from my chapter on James Baldwin in 




well as that of other blacks. He opened an imaginative space in 
which North Americans entrapped in isolationist encampments 
could be free and re-envision themselves as relational beings ca-
pable of living with difference. In the 1984 introduction to Notes 
of a Native Son, Baldwin described the menacing effects of ra-
cialized living in America. Symbolically, socially, and materially, 
human lives were affected by a problematic cultural system that 
elevated certain bodies over others, ultimately leaving all alien-
ated from each other. 
For Baldwin, racialized existence in its most extreme form 
was expressed in a black-white oppositional logic that was om-
nipresent: “The conundrum of color is the inheritance of every 
American, be he/she legally or actually Black or White. It is a 
fearful inheritance, for which untold multitudes, long ago, sold 
their birthright. Multitudes are doing so, until today” (Baldwin 
1998, 810).3 His writings reverberate with the conundrum of af-
firming life and embracing one’s humanity in a world (or cul-
ture of values) that one has not created. As such, they reveal an 
important observation about black lives in America that Fred-
erick Douglass articulated in the nineteenth century when ad-
dressing the National Colored Convention of 1853: “Our white 
fellow-country men do not know us. They are strangers to our 
character, ignorant of our capacity, oblivious of our history and 
progress, and are misinformed as to the principles and ideas 
that control and guide us as a people. The great mass of Ameri-
can citizens estimate us as being a characterless and purposeless 
people” (Douglass 2000, 269). 
3 Given the historical framework in which Baldwin was writing, his critiques 
target a problematic, limited binary constituted by the symbolic notions of 
whiteness and blackness. As current Critical Race Theory suggests, how-
ever, racist discourse emerges from the dominance of a white supremacist 
ideology, or a master narrative that has failed to include the value and ex-
periences of all groups whose identities have been isolated from and seen 
as distinct from “white” skin and everything associated with this distinc-
tion. In my broader work on religious naturalism, I emphasize this broader 
notion of racialized discourse as pertaining to all marginalized voices and 




Baldwin experienced these racial distortions of his (and by 
extension, other blacks’) humanity in the United States while 
seeking a sense of sense of authentic selfhood. In the beginning 
of “Nobody Knows My Name,” he declared: 
I left America because I doubted my ability to survive the 
fury of the color problem here. […] I wanted to prevent my-
self from becoming merely a Negro; or even, merely a Negro 
writer. I wanted to find out in what way the specialness of my 
experience could be made to connect me with other people 
instead of dividing me from them. (Baldwin 1998, 137) 
Here I imagine Baldwin as a scriptor of human possibilities, 
seeking an expansive view of the human capacity to relate and 
connect with others without being restricted by problematic ra-
cial constructs. With refreshing candor, he targeted white su-
premacy as a cultural value system that functioned to reduce 
and obscure his ability to connect with others (and with him-
self) on a more fundamental, existential level. In such a system, 
his blackness — its symbolic resonance and its tactile material-
ity — became a source of alienation and disconnection under 
the disconcerting white gaze. 
As Baldwin also discovered, another form of this alienation 
would be felt beyond American borders in enlightened Europe. 
In the well known essay, “Stranger in the Village” (1953), Bald-
win recounted his experiences living in a tiny Swiss village. Re-
flecting on what it meant to be a stranger thrown in a raced 
world that he had not created, Baldwin observed that the peo-
ple of the village cannot be, from the point of view of power, 
strangers anywhere in the world. He wrote about the children’s 
response to him as an exotic rarity as they shout Neger! Neger! in 
the streets, oblivious to his reaction (Baldwin, 1998). Notwith-
standing the saluts and bonsoirs that Baldwin exchanged with 
his neighbors under the social convention of politeness, he saw 
in their eyes elements of paranoia and malevolence. In these en-
counters, Baldwin understood (or grasped) his “black” identity 
in personal and passionate terms. Notably, for Baldwin, this en-
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counter with self was not a result of a disembodied, detached 
abstraction, but a deep involvement in the concreteness and full 
materiality of life. His experience in the Swiss village led him to 
reflect on the European roots of white racism and its later ap-
pearance in the United States: 
For this village brings home to me this fact: that there was a 
day, and not really a very distant day, when Americans were 
scarcely Americans at all but discontented Europeans, facing 
a great unconquered continent and strolling, say, into a mar-
ketplace and seeing black men for the first time. (Baldwin 
1998, 124) 
The very visibility of blackness that Baldwin alluded to — the 
sight of black skin — measures the importance of materiality in 
his racial discourse. This racialized discourse also provided the 
backdrop for Baldwin’s bastard metaphor, alerting readers to his 
aspirations of acquiring ontological wholeness both for himself 
and others. Later, while reflecting on his sojourns in Europe and 
implicitly conjoining the singular with the collective, Baldwin 
inscribed a type of existence for black Americans that could at 
best be described, pathetically, as non-essential and marginal. In 
“Autobiographical Notes” from Notes Of a Native Son, Baldwin 
asserted: 
I know, in any case, that the most crucial time in my own 
development came when I was forced to recognize that I was 
a kind of bastard of the West; when I followed the line of my 
past I did not find myself in Europe but in Africa. And this 
meant that in some subtle way, in a really profound way, I 
brought to Shakespeare, Bach, Rembrandt, to the stones of 
Paris, to the cathedral at Chartres, and to the Empire State 
Building, a special attitude. These were not really my cre-
ations, they did not contain my history; I might search in 
them in vain forever for any reflection of myself. I was an 
interloper; this was not my heritage. (Baldwin 1998, 7–8) 
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The cultural resonance of Baldwin’s bastard metaphor here is 
noteworthy. The cultural artifacts he encountered that purport-
edly symbolized the best of human aspirations, desires, hopes, 
and creativity did not reflect his contributions as an African 
American. With sobering awareness, his sense of illegitimacy is 
heightened when he realizes that in this Euro-American cultur-
al lineage, he was essentially being confronted with prevailing 
configurations of the normative human: an ideology of white-
ness. 
Moreover, for Baldwin, experiencing oneself as a bastard 
evoked a sense of not knowing one’s true, fuller identity. In-
deed, black bastards in the U.S. are perpetually hidden from 
their truest selves when forced daily to wear a cloak of shame 
or inferiority that has been woven by a cultural legacy built on 
white supremacy. Equally important, in Baldwin’s observations, 
American whites selfishly and ingeniously denied their cul-
pability in creating this legacy of differentiation; in re-invent-
ing — in more and more ingenious ways — the omnipresence of 
whiteness, white Americans intensified the alienating effects of 
problematic racial constructions. As he wrote, “The price that 
the white American paid for his ticket was to become white —: 
and, in the main, nothing more than that, or, as he was to insist, 
nothing less” (Baldwin 1985, xx). 
With an emphasis on materiality and corporeality, Bald-
win asserted again and again that black and white Americans 
are blood relatives — they shared the same biological origins. 
What his contemporaries often perceived as a racial problem 
essentially masked a more fundamental problem: forgetfulness 
of our common humanity. As he declared in No Name in the 
Street (1972), “The problem is rooted in the question of how one 
treats one’s flesh and blood, especially one’s children. The blacks 
are the despised and slaughtered children of the great Western 
house — nameless and unnamable bastards” (Baldwin 1998, 
468). 
With a critical awareness of experiencing oneself, one’s peo-
ple, one’s culture as not quite genuine — as irregular, inferior, or 
of dubious origin — Baldwin spoke of cultivating a special atti-
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tude, [a] “special place in this scheme” (Baldwin 1998, 8). While 
not denying the reality of cultural and historical forces, Baldwin 
also declared that humans are always so much more than what 
our cultural markers claim for us. As he realized, “I had to claim 
my birthright. I am what time, circumstance, history, have made 
of me, certainly, but I am, also, much more than that. So are we 
all” (Baldwin 1998, 810). 
These passages help underscore the ontological implications 
implicit in Baldwin’s critical discourse. Claiming one’s heritage 
is part of a more complex process of actualizing oneself as one 
relates to others, aspiring to achieve and experience one’s hu-
manity without falling prey to the damaging effects of a binary 
system that demarcates some humans as more, others as less. As 
he noted, the problematic question of African Americans’ “hu-
manity,” and of their “rights as human being[s]” became such 
a burning question for several generations of Americans that 
it ultimately “became one of those used to divide the nation” 
(Baldwin 1998, 125).
However, for Baldwin, his — and all blacks’ — heroic acts of 
self-actualization were not enough to address the great racial di-
vide. Courageous acts by whites were crucial in helping to trans-
form America; specifically, what was essentially needed was the 
honest admission by white Americans of their pivotal role in 
creating the current state of affairs in the America of his day: 
bastardizing blacks’ existence there. In short, naming and fore-
going the normativity of whiteness in America was tantamount. 
Historically, this meant whites admission of the systemic, wide-
spread cultural violence perpetuated by the state in its con-
struction and adoration of whiteness. White Americans must 
acknowledge, first and foremost, this shared history of blacks 
and whites. In The Price of The Ticket, Baldwin states: 
The record is there for all to read. It resounds all over the 
world. It might as well be written in the sky. One wishes that 
Americans — white Americans — would read, for their own 
sakes, this record and stop defending themselves against it. 
Only then will they be enabled to change their lives. The fact 
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that they have not yet been able to do this — to face their his-
tory, to change their lives — hideously menaces this country. 
Indeed, it menaces the entire world. (Baldwin 1985, 410–11) 
According to Baldwin, the subjugated history perpetuated by 
white Americans was the key to their identity, as well as the tri-
umph and justification of their history; furthermore, their ma-
terial well-being depended on this continued subjugation. He 
asserts: 
One may now see that the history, which is now indivisible 
from oneself, has been full of errors and excesses, but this 
is not the same thing as seeing that, for millions of people, 
this history — oneself — has been nothing but an intoler-
able yoke, a stinking prison, a shrieking grave. It is not so 
easy to see that, for millions of people, life itself depends on 
the speediest possible demolition of this history, even if this 
means the leveling, or the destruction of its heirs. (Baldwin 
1985, 473) 
To be heirs of history, in this context, is to construct and main-
tain the reality that one desires. Outsiders, or bastards, Baldwin 
suggests, are denied this very act of creating reality for oneself. 
In No Name in the Street, Baldwin asserted that white suprem-
acy operates historically in prohibiting blacks in America (and 
the ‘black’ Algerians in France) from constructing their own 
freedom and choosing to become what they may desire. In other 
words, their experiences within the subjugated history of white-
ness amounts to an essential lack of access to oneself: “The Alge-
rian and I were both, alike, victims of this history, and I was still 
a part of Africa, even though I had been carried out of it nearly 
four hundred years before” (Baldwin 1998, 377). 
The radical nature of materiality and historical position-
ing for Baldwin is notable here as he resists the pernicious and 
violence perpetrated by history in order to affirm unrecog-
nized — or bastards’ — accounts of history. Thus, an important 
insight of Baldwin, which I will emphasize in promoting my 
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model of religious naturalism, is that humans do not transcend 
our variegated identities in the act of affirming our common 
humanity. Rather, we affirm our identities through a radically 
refigured conception of our humanity, which always includes 
historical specificity, diversity, and dynamic processing of be-
coming. 
In other contexts, Baldwin also alluded to the formation of 
a bastard (outsider’s) status that keeps blacks intimately identi-
fied with exile — or of not knowing home in the way that white 
Americans have created home in the U.S. — and thus of never 
feeling accepted, fully known, or even embraced by their white 
counterparts. He describes the tragic sense of forlornness that 
black Americans feel in experiencing a diaspora that never ends. 
As he describes it, “Later, in the midnight hour, the missing 
identity aches. One can neither assess nor overcome the storm 
of the middle passage. One is mysteriously shipwrecked forever, 
in the Great New World” (Baldwin 1985, xix). 
Black Bastards, Desire, and Religious Entrapments
Baldwin’s vision of a nobler view of humanity led him to in-
dict the construction of whiteness in the United States, which 
both aided in demarcating and separating a common human-
ity that all shared and fostered myriad forms of alienation and 
hatred among various individuals and groups. In dismantling 
this edifice, he targeted a major cultural institution: religion, 
and specifically Christianity. Baldwin keenly recognized that 
key religious ideas functioned (either explicitly or implicitly) in 
a racist culture essentially to devalue black bodies as unworthy 
and inherently inferior to white ones, and they generated deeply 
embedded black self-loathing among many African Americans. 
In To Crush a Serpent (1987), one of his final published essays, 
Baldwin summed up a theme that he had addressed throughout 
many earlier ones: “Race and religion, it has been remarked, are 
fearfully entangled in the guts of this nation, so profoundly that 
to speak of the one is to conjure up the other. One cannot speak 
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of sin without referring to blackness, and blackness stalks our 
history and our streets” (Baldwin 2010, 200). 
Baldwin addressed the wider matrix of cultural meanings in-
herent in religious systems, showing how they both shape, and 
are shaped, by the behaviors of many black and white U.S. citi-
zens. Within this context, the bastard metaphor was illuminat-
ing, as it helped Baldwin to underscore a truth that most wanted 
to ignore: white Americans denial of any familial kinship with 
blacks. As Baldwin observed in the interview with James Moss-
man, “The great dilemma of being a white American precisely is 
that they deny their only kinship” (Stanley and Pratt 1989, 50). 
He specifically targeted the hypocrisy of white Christians who, 
in an attempt to maintain their social order identity as white 
people, willfully denied their own moral connection (and bio-
logical kinship) to those of African descent, whom they contin-
ued to exploit. 
In both dominant white Christian culture and the holiness 
tradition of his youth, which he saw as absorbing problemat-
ic ideological aspects of the former, Baldwin identified a root 
problem, manifest in various ways and on different levels: sys-
tematic vilification of blackness. He specifically targeted the 
symbol God as a reified marker that posited whiteness as rep-
resentative of aesthetic and moral truths; equally important, it 
established whiteness as constitutive of normative humanity. 
Furthermore, whiteness was a social identity rooted in a god-
complex, representing dominant culture’s desperate avoidance 
of its own limitations as whites denied the beauty, value, and 
complex humanity of African Americans. He wrote at length 
about the depth of anti-blackness pervasive in American culture 
subtlety embedded in religious mechanisms. In The Fire Next 
Time, Baldwin observed: 
Negroes in this country — and Negroes do not, strictly or 
legally speaking, exist in any other — are taught really to de-
spise themselves from the moment their eyes open on the 
world. This world is white and they are black. White people 
hold the power, which means that they are superior to blacks 
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(intrinsically, that is: God decreed it so), and the world has 
innumerable ways of making this difference known and felt 
and feared. (Baldwin 1998, 302)
In linking the notion of white supremacy with theistic belief 
and doctrinal certainty, Baldwin revealed why some cultural 
values entrenched in racial distortions appear as real, enduring, 
and authoritative truths. In the face of unrelenting racism and 
brutality, Baldwin thus saw structured religion as an obstacle to 
blacks’ achieving authentic selfhood and integrity of being. In 
To Crush a Serpent, for example, Baldwin discussed the adverse 
psychological effects of those white Christian theological sys-
tems that invoked the curse of Ham to both justify slavery and 
devalue black subjectivities (Baldwin 2010: 196). The rabid anti-
blackness in such dangerous fabrications was alarming to Bald-
win, who unmasked them as distortions of empirical truths. 
Even more troubling for Baldwin were the insidious psycho-
logical effects on blacks of paying homage to the Christian de-
ity. In commenting on the paradoxical nature of worship in the 
God-intoxicated holiness tradition of his youth, he observed: 
“But God — and I felt this even then, so long ago, on that tre-
mendous floor, unwilling — is white. And if His love was so 
great, and if He loved all His children, why were we, the black, 
cast down so far?” (Baldwin 1998, 304–305). Although he ac-
knowledged the black church (in all of its various structures) 
was often a haven and site of communal safety from blatant acts 
of racism, Baldwin also saw its complicity with white suprema-
cy as blacks’ harbored fear and hatred of their own bodies and 
those that looked like theirs. He perceived a form of self-hatred 
embedded in his tradition’s ritualistic fervor and rites of puri-
fication where, ironically, distraught religious adherents often 
denied themselves the healing, love, and pleasure they were en-
titled to experience: “And the passion with which we loved the 
Lord was a measure of how deeply we feared and distrusted, 
and, in the end, hated almost all strangers, always, and avoided 
and despised ourselves” (Baldwin 1998, 310). 
37
polyamorous bastards
This awareness led Baldwin to another troubling insight: 
one unfortunate outcome of internalized anti-blackness was a 
lack of love in the black Church. In The Fire Next Time, Baldwin 
mused, “I really mean that there was no love in the church,” add-
ing that it was a mask for “hatred and self-hatred and despair” 
(Baldwin 1998, 309). Baldwin experienced and witnessed the 
degree to which this self-hatred — extraordinarily moralistic in 
tone — was a guise for advancing anti-body, anti-sexual, xeno-
phobic, and homophobic sentiments. Such anti-love fostered a 
passivity and repression of all that he and others experienced as 
naturally good, and it required the relinquishing of one’s indi-
viduality. 
Amid the violent forms of alienation caused by problematic 
racial distinctions, Baldwin introduced a radical view of love. 
For Baldwin, love is a term that describes a state of being one 
affirms again and again in the process of choosing to enact one’s 
authentic humanity: 
Love takes off the masks that we fear we cannot live without 
and know we cannot live within. I use the word “love” here 
not merely in the personal sense but as a state of being, or a 
state of grace — not in the infantile American sense of being 
made happy but in the tough universal sense of quest and 
daring and growth. (Baldwin 1998, 341) 
With his usual flair and emotionality intensity, Baldwin con-
joined the private and the public, the personal and the political, 
to describe a transformative embodied love that brings aware-
ness of our common humanity. In “No Name in The Street,” his 
eloquence is breathtaking when describing falling in love with 
another concrete, material human being — an experience that 
unhinges the entrapments of racial constructs: 
It began to pry open for me the trap of color, for people do 
not fall in love according to their color — this may come as 
news to noble pioneers and eloquent astronauts, to say noth-
ing of most of the representatives of most of the American 
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states — and when lovers quarrel, as indeed they inevitably 
do, it is not the degree of their pigmentation that they are 
quarreling about, nor can lovers, on any level whatever, use 
color as a weapon. This means that one must accept one’s na-
kedness. And nakedness has no color: this can come as news 
only to those who have never covered, or been covered by, 
another naked human being. (Baldwin 1998, 366) 
Baldwin’s embodied love described above evokes the Sartrean 
notion of intersubjectivity: Recognizing the humanity of the 
other before oneself confronts one’s subjectivity in the most im-
mediate way, both limiting and enabling what one could possibly 
choose in any given context. This intimate encounter of know-
ing and being known by another brings with it a new awareness 
of seeing others differently and experiencing one’s humanity as 
both free and bound. As Baldwin stated, an individual is both 
stronger and more vulnerable, both free and bound: “Free, para-
doxically, because, now, you have a home — your lover’s arms. 
And bound: to that mystery, precisely, a bondage which liber-
ates you into something of the glory and suffering of the world” 
(Baldwin 1989, 366). 
The embodied love Baldwin evoked also imbued traditional 
religious terms with new fresh, expanded meanings. His radi-
cal view of love was “something active, more like a fire, like a 
wind,” not an empty abstraction describing a passive stance be-
fore some authorial figure outside of oneself (Stanley and Pratt 
1998, 48). Here, we see Baldwin rejecting the traditional other-
worldly eschatological discourse of fear and damnation featured 
in holiness traditions, and replacing it with an emphasis on the 
concrete dynamics of living here and now. Likewise, salvation 
is that which we must do to save each other; for Baldwin, the 
most crucial aspect of salvation is its rootedness in human ac-
tions and efforts. The contingencies of life and concreteness of 
human experiences require redemptive actions from humans 
themselves. In “To Crush a Serpent” Baldwin asserted that sal-
vation does not divide, but conjoins, so that “one sees oneself in 
others and others in oneself. It is not the exclusive property of 
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any dogma, creed, or church. It keeps the channel open between 
oneself and however one wishes to name That which is greater 
than oneself ” (Baldwin 2010, 203). 
Baldwin believed embracing embodied love could result in 
a vital flourishing for all North Americans. He reiterated this 
theme in a speech he gave in San Francisco in October of 1960. 
Addressing the writer’s role in American life, Baldwin empha-
sized and articulated a moral vision that celebrates the potential 
of newly formed human relationships to create and sustain new 
possibilities for Americans. In his thinking, humans displace 
the traditional God and enact transformation in their lives, 
redeeming themselves from impoverished, erroneous views of 
their shared humanity. For example, after insisting on neces-
sary changes to the dominant configuration of raced living in 
America, Baldwin ended the speech with the following words 
about the U.S.: 
It will not be transformed by an act of God, but by all of us, 
by you and me. I don’t believe any longer that we can afford 
to say that it is entirely out of our hands. We made the world 
we’re living in and we have to make it over. (Baldwin 1992, 
154) 
In Baldwin’s hands, traditional African-American religiosity 
is destabilized and uprooted from a metaphysical system that 
pits a supernatural deity over and against sinful humans. He 
displaced traditional supernaturalism, exchanging the external 
deity beyond nature for the power of love expressed in embod-
ied, material human relationships. In short, for Baldwin, hu-
mans save each other. As D. Quentin Miller suggested, one can 
see Baldwin moving from the ultimate expression of external 
authority — God — to the broader community collectively and 
individually (Miller 2000, 3). 
Furthermore, the fuller expression of Baldwin’s form of com-
munal ontology recognized a common humanity constitutive 
of our biotic materiality on which various identity markers are 
couched and binary oppositions attached. As he emphatically 
40
meaningful flesh
stated at one point: “It is so simple a fact and one that is so hard, 
apparently, to grasp: Whoever debases others is debasing himself” 
(Baldwin 1998, 334). Here, Baldwin anticipated the basic thrust 
of my religious naturalism, which emphasizes the deep genetic 
homology structuring all life forms — what I describe as hu-
mans’ interconnectedness with each other and with all natural 
organisms.
Our Common Humanity: Emergence of an African-
American Religious Naturalism
An African-American religious naturalism emerges out of a 
critical awareness that religiosity is not necessarily centered in 
any specific tradition. Rather, it can be a mode of reflecting on, 
experiencing, and envisioning one’s relationality with all that is. 
Here, I evoke the views of Peter Van Ness, who wrote eloquently 
of the spiritual dimension of life “as the embodied task of real-
izing one’s truest self in the context of reality apprehended as 
a cosmic totality. It is the quest for attaining an optimal rela-
tionship between what one truly is and everything that is” (Van 
Ness 1996, 5). Consequently, a fuller emergence of this African-
American religious naturalism is possible if, and only if, we con-
tinue to keep our focus on artful, material human organisms, or 
on the efforts of relational humans. Within the context of Afri-
can-American life and culture, this means that any truths we are 
ever going to discover, and any meaning in life we will uncover, 
are revealed to us through our own efforts as natural beings. 
This religious view expressly rejects any suggestion of the su-
pernatural — there is nothing that transcends the natural world. 
Donald Crosby provided an elegant summary of the prominent 
status of nature in religious naturalism: 
Nature requires no explanation beyond itself. It always has 
existed and always will exist in some shape or form. Its con-
stituents, principles, laws, and relations are the sole reality. 
This reality takes on new traits and possibilities as it evolves 
inexorably through time. Human beings are integral parts 
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of nature, and they are natural beings through and through. 
They, like all living beings, are outcomes of biological evo-
lution. They are embodied beings whose mental or spiritual 
aspect is not something separate from their bodies but a 
function of their bodily nature. There is no realm of the su-
pernatural and no supernatural being or beings residing in 
such a realm. (Cosby 2008, ix–x) 
Nature itself becomes a focal point for assessing our human de-
sires, dreams, and possibilities — for assessing what can emerge 
from the past. Fifty years removed from Baldwin’s nomadic sen-
sibilities and his emphasis on materiality and embodied desire, 
I envision a religious naturalism that requires us to take seri-
ously the idea of our humanity as an achievement, not a given. 
More specifically, this emergent religious naturalism compels 
African Americans to reflect meaningfully on the emergence of 
matter (and especially life) from the Big Bang forward, promot-
ing an understanding of myriad nature as complex processes of 
becoming. Its theoretical appeal is the fundamental conception 
of humans as natural processes intrinsically connected to other 
natural processes. This insight helps to blur the arbitrary on-
tological lines that human animals have erected between other 
species and natural processes and us. 
With Loyal Rue, I endorse a portrayal of human beings as 
star-born, earth-formed creatures endowed by evolutionary 
processes to seek reproductive fitness under the guidance of 
biological, psychological, and cultural systems that have been 
selected for their utility in mediating adaptive behaviors (Rue 
2005, 77). Humans maximize their chances for reproductive fit-
ness by managing the complexity of these systems in ways that 
are conducive to the simultaneous achievement of personal 
wholeness and social coherence. Rue wrote:
The meaning of human life should be expressed in terms of 
how our particular species pursues the ultimate telos of re-
productive fitness. Like every other species, we seek the ulti-
mate biological goal according to our peculiar nature. That is, 
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by pursuing the many teloi that are internal to our behavior 
mediation systems, whether these teloi are built into the sys-
tem by genetic means or incorporated into them by symbolic 
means. For humans there are many immediate teloi, includ-
ing the biological goals inherent in our drive systems, the 
psychological goals implicit in our emotional and cognitive 
systems, and the social goals we imbibe through our sym-
bolic systems. Human life is about whatever these goals are 
about. (Rue 2005, 75)
Appreciating human life as one distinct biotic form emerging 
from, and participating in, a series of evolutionary processes 
that constitute the diversity of life has monumental implications 
for African-American culture. Here, the scientific epic becomes 
the starting point for positing an African-American religious 
humanism constituted by a central tenet: humans are relational 
processes of nature; in short, we are nature made aware of itself. 
In declaring such, I contend that our humanity is not a given, 
but rather an achievement. 
Consider that from a strictly biological perspective, humans 
are organisms that have slowly evolved by a process of natural 
selection from earlier primates. From one generation to another, 
the species that is alive now has gradually adapted to changing 
environments so that it could continue to survive. Our animal-
ity, from this perspective, is living under the influence of genes, 
instincts, and emotions with the prime directive to survive and 
procreate. Yet, this minimalist approach fails to consider what a 
few cognitive scientists and most philosophers, humanists, and 
religionists tend to accentuate: our own personal experience of 
what it is like to be an experiencing human being. Becoming 
human, or actualizing ourselves as human beings, in this sense, 
emerges out of an awareness and desire to be more than a con-
glomeration of pulsating cells. It is suggesting that our humanity 
is not reducible to organizational patterns or processes domi-
nated by brain structures, nor do DNA, diet, behavior, and the 
environment solely structure it. Human animals become human 
destinies when we posit fundamental questions of value, mean-
43
polyamorous bastards
ing, and purpose to our existence. Our coming to be human 
destinies is structured by a crucial question: How do we come to 
terms with life? (White 2016, 32–33).
In this African-American religious view, sacrality is a specif-
ic affirmation and appreciation of that which is fundamentally 
important in life or that which is ultimately valued: relational 
Nature. Humans are interconnected parts of Nature, and our 
sacrality is a given part of Nature’s richness, spectacular com-
plexity, and beauty. Notwithstanding the diverse cultural and 
individual approaches of articulating this truth, there is for me, 
quite simply, the sacrality of human deep interconnectedness 
with all that is. Finding meaning and value in our lives within 
the natural order presupposes our fundamental interconnected-
ness. We can claim and become our humanity in seeking and 
finding community with others — and with otherness. This is a 
simple value that religious discourse has advanced and reiter-
ated again and again. As Ursula Goodenough observed: 
We have throughout the ages sought connection with higher 
powers in the sky or beneath the earth, or with ancestors in 
some other realm. We have also sought, and found, religious 
fellowship with one another. And now we realize that we are 
connected to all creatures. Not just in food chains or eco-
logical equilibria. We share a common ancestor. We share 
genes for receptors and cell cycles and signal-transduction 
cascades. We share evolutionary constraints and possibilities. 
We are connected all the way down. (Goodenough 1998, 75) 
The basic conception of the human as an emergent, intercon-
nected life form amid spectacular biotic diversity has far-reach-
ing ethical implications within the context of African-American 
culture. First, it contributes to an intellectual legacy that has at-
tempted to overcome the deficient conceptions of our humanity 
ensnared in problematic racial constructions. African-Amer-
ican religious naturalism presupposes human beings as biotic 
forms emerging from evolutionary processes sharing a deep 
homology with other sentient beings and also valuing such con-
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nections. Accordingly, it challenges racially constructed views 
that have persistently placed blacks outside of the circle of hu-
manity. 
Second, this model of African American rejects a view of 
our humanity solely as an individualistic phenomenon — some 
type of communal ontology is implied. A crucial lesson here is 
that notwithstanding the cultural and national differences and 
specificities we construct, humans are all genetically connected 
and part of a greater whole — any harm done to another hu-
man is essentially harm done to ourselves. We are essentially 
celebrating a relational self that can resist solipsistic tendencies 
and egoistic impulses: there is no isolated self who stands over 
against the fields of interaction. Put another way, there is no pri-
vate self or final line between interiority and exteriority — we 
always include the other (even if by acting to exclude it). The self 
is constitutionally relational and inevitably entangled in tempo-
ral becoming. 
Finally, this African-American religious naturalism provides 
the impetus and vision for continued social justice action in 
the twenty-first century. With its emphasis on deep connectiv-
ity — with oneself, family, larger human community, local and 
global ecosystems, and the universe — this religious naturalism 
seeks a transformed existence. Religiously, this implies love, and 
love implies concern for the well being of the beloved. African-
American religious naturalism reinforces perennial, expansive 
perspectives from the wisdom traditions that adamantly pro-
mote kindness, empathy, and compassion for all natural pro-
cesses, including human ones. With the capacity to influence 
each other and other natural processes, humans have a respon-
sibility to act in ways that promote the flourishing of all life, and 
to urge other humans that may be less inclined to acknowledge 
our interconnectedness to do the same. Any inkling of white su-
premacy, or sense of cultural superiority of any ilk, is antitheti-
cal to this natural view; these eschewed cultural constructions 
are forced impositions on the wholeness of natural interrelat-




Baldwin’s America: From Bastards to Freaks
With its conception of human animals as value-laden organ-
isms, African-American religious naturalism encourages us 
to challenge the most viral constructions of “isms” rooted in 
problematic self-other differentiations. Inspired by Baldwin’s 
concept of embodied love, this religiosity resists normalizing 
discourses (often disguised as moral truths) that thwart human 
desire to connect with and love others. In short, it engages in 
queer resistance. Here I return again to Baldwin to underscore 
this point. In doing so, I evoke Melvin Dixon’s extended use of 
the notion of lieux de mémoire (sites of memory) to augment 
the importance of Baldwin’s work for inaugurating a black queer 
sensibility that challenged traditional race-centered discourses 
in African-American critical writing (Dixon 2006). I also follow 
the lead of Michael L. Cobb and others, who remind us of the 
ways in which Baldwin illuminated the complicated intersec-
tions of queerness, blackness, and religious rhetoric (Cobb and 
Michael 2001). In this brief discussion, I focus on his essays and 
interviews rather than influential fictional works, which also re-
flect these perspectives. 
Because Baldwin did not fit standard heterosexual norms, 
people sought to label him. As he imagined a space to live au-
thentically, Baldwin found certain categories reductive and 
impoverishing, failing to capture the full experience of human 
connection he sought. His queer sensibilities recognized that 
these labels were not merely handy descriptions in a culture 
that he had not helped to design; rather, they conveyed implicit 
moral and ontological meanings and were used to restrict his 
humanity and distort his nomadic desiring. During an inter-
view with journalist James Mossman and Colin MacInnes in 
1965, Baldwin asserted:
[T]hose terms, homosexual, bisexual, heterosexual are 20th-
century terms which, for me, really have very little meaning. 
I’ve never, myself, in watching myself and watching other 
people, watching life, been able to discern exactly where the 
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barriers were. Life being what life is, and passion being what 
passion is. (Stanley and Pratt 1989, 54)
In keeping with my robust reading of Baldwin, I see this response 
as an enactment of queer resistance. Baldwin refused to see his 
desire to connect intimately with another male as an example 
of a “homosexual” summation. He recognized that categories 
of sexual identity are often used to demarcate and evaluate the 
wide range of erotic desire along a continuum, implying a range 
from the normative to the illegitimate. Moreover, Baldwin saw 
that “distrust of the affections and of the flesh […] [is] revealed 
most grotesquely in what we call the sexual deviants, the sexual 
minorities, who are really simply the most vivid victims of our 
system of mortification of the flesh” (Stanley and Pratt 1989, 55). 
In a 1985 essay titled “Here Be Dragons” (also published as 
“Freaks and the American Ideal of Manhood”), Baldwin also 
made fruitful connections among race, erotic-desiring beings, 
and nationalistic mythology. He observed that U.S. expressions 
of sexuality were rooted in an American ideal of masculinity, 
which perpetuate problematic binary differentiations: “good 
guys and bad guys, punks and studs, tough guys and softies, 
butch and faggot, black and white” (Baldwin 1998, 815). Drawing 
on his personal experiences as a young black male exploring de-
sire in Greenwich Village, Baldwin described lonely, alienating 
encounters with other males (often white or of another ethnic-
ity) who both expressed desire for him as well as self-revulsion 
in desiring a black queer male. He also noted the virtual absence 
of black women in the Village when describing a few sexual en-
counters with white women whom he feared brought to their 
sexual encounters the desire to “civilize you into becoming an 
appendage” or with the individual who desired “a black boy to 
sleep with because she wanted to humiliate her parents” (Bald-
win 1998, 824). 
In Baldwin’s nomenclature of desire, he became a freak. Here, 
a key insight of his analysis is that freaks represent an epistemic 
marker that conjoins race, gender, and sexuality in U.S. culture. 
Freaks are deviant individuals who do not conform to the ideal 
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standards of sexuality and normative configurations of mas-
culine identity within a racist, homophobic culture. Baldwin 
observed: “Freaks are called freaks and are treated as they are 
treated — in the main, abominably — because they are human 
beings who cause to echo, deep within us, our most profound 
terrors and desires” (Baldwin 1998, 828). Accordingly, freaks un-
cloak a horrific and terrifying truth about purportedly “normal” 
people, providing insight into the dangers, violence, and weak-
nesses endemic to the American ideal of masculinity. As such, 
freaks remain outliers, sharing with bastards an illegitimacy that 
keeps the cultural myth intact. 
As a site of memory, Baldwin’s case is illuminative. Earlier 
he had critiqued the dangers of establishing the pure white god 
as the ontological grounding for an inferior humanity in which 
blacks represented the most depraved case. Here, in a parallel 
move, we see Baldwin exposing another sacrosanct truth based 
on whiteness: an ontological ordering that established white 
male heterosexuality the norm for ascertaining and evaluating 
other expressions of desire. Confronting this standard, Baldwin 
exposed a national psyche enshrouded in a fear of material-
ity, femininity, and blackness. For Baldwin, black gay, effemi-
nate men are archetypes of this triple threat — they fascinate as 
phantasms and yet are reviled as actual humans. While limited 
in its lack of serious attention to female bodies, lesbian desires, 
or even complex configurations of femininity, Baldwin’s insights 
are nonetheless helpful and anticipate later queer interventions 
and orientations. 
With rapt attention to multiplicities and differences in desire 
and embodied love, Baldwin problematized the constitutions 
of gender and sexual identities as binary, separated, and fixed 
categories. He also alerted us to the dangers of emplacing what 
is fluid and porous with normalizing discourses. Going beyond 
a vision of our humanity dictated by compulsory heterosexual-
ity, he ends this absorbing essay with an image of an androgy-
nous humanity where inter-related, inter-connected sexual, ra-
cial and gendered beings belong to each other. As he declared: 
“[E]ach of us, helplessly and forever, contains the other — male 
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in female, female in male, white in black, and black in white. We 
are a part of each other” (Baldwin 1998, 828). 
Polyamorous Bastards: Becoming Our Humanity
Inspired by Baldwin’s creative reach, my trajectory of African-
American religious naturalism promotes a black queer critical 
consciousness that resists regimes of the normal. In this final 
section, I elaborate on this point, utilizing Claudia Schippert’s 
work in queer theory and religion to underscore African-Amer-
ican religious naturalism as an instance of queer religiosity. In 
“Implications of Queer Theory for the Study of Religion and 
Gender: Entering the Third Decade,” Schippert observed that 
queer theoretical analysis itself is an emergent discourse that 
continually shifts and translates in diverse geographic-cultural 
configurations (Schippert 2011). Furthermore, within the con-
text of religious scholarship and studies, queer theory continues 
to expand its theoretical applicability and usefulness. For Schip-
pert, then, queering religion has something to do with expand-
ing the sphere and proper object of study in religion. This is 
what Schippert suggested with the term ‘undisciplined’ religion: 
When approaching religion queerly then, we can no longer 
simply ‘add’ queer identities to an ‘inclusive’ liberationist 
agenda. […] The implications of the challenges and rethink-
ing of the field of religion indicate that what is being studied 
as the discipline of religion is shifting focus on previously ex-
cluded topics. Studying religion queerly can be, and perhaps 
will need to be, (more) undisciplined. (Schippert 2011, 74)
The emergent African-American religious naturalism that I 
have sketched in this essay contributes to this undisciplined 
space. As a trajectory of religiosity in African-American cul-
ture, it destabilizes traditional religious methods that purport 
to establish humanity’s desires of actualization on metaphysical 
views of a superior deity; this religiosity also problematizes the 
notion that religious ideas and ethical practices are necessarily 
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grounded in transcendental ideals. Rather, it honors the com-
plex ways value-laden human animals attempt to enact our de-
sire for others, fulfilling emotional, physical, and psychological 
needs. Rejecting traditional onto-theological claims of reality 
as the source of our being, this religious perspective celebrates 
value-laden organisms fundamentally coming to terms with life, 
or making sense of their existence, in relationship with others. 
Compelled by the evolutionary epic, this queer African-Amer-
ican religious naturalism offers an expanded view of humans 
as intrinsically relational, natural organisms and vital centers of 
value — or humans as lovers of life, motivated by a desire for 
goodness and connection with all that is. 
Schippert also noted that queer religiosity has placed much 
more focus on transnational and diasporic identities, including 
a plethora of voices, identities, bodies, and cultural ways of be-
ing both queer and religious. Here, queer theorists are mindful 
of addressing “identities, community and consumption prac-
tices, and the workings of kinship and family practices in more 
complex configurations. No longer is the white, gay, Western 
(Christian/secular) man the assumed author, audience, or ob-
ject of study within queer theoretical texts” (Schippert 2011, 75). 
The queer African-American religious perspective I endorse 
here supports this task. With an expansive view of our common 
humanity, it compels us to keep in focus the desires of margin-
alized, often forgotten humans — polyamorous bastards — who 
resist substantive ontologies and onto-theological loyalties. 
Inspired by Baldwin, Audre Lorde, Bayard Rustin, and count-
less other nameless bastards and freaks who dared to humanize 
their desire, it accentuates the pleasurable “roaming” of a queer 
love that celebrates humans’ radical relationality with each other 
and, I emphasize, with other natural processes. However, un-
like the lonely repressed males sketched by Baldwin in “Here 
Be Freaks,” polyamorous bastards wander with bold audacity, 
cherishing all forms of materiality. 
Evoking Baldwin’s sense of the illegitimacy shared by bas-
tards and freaks, queer African-American religious natural-
ism also assumes a self-critical stance against normativity. This 
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point needs a bit of clarification in light of Schippert’s discussion 
of the new homonormativity in Lisa Duggan’s analysis of the 
sexual politics of neoliberal conservatism. As a strain of con-
servative moralism, Duggan argued, homonormativity’s aim 
is in establishing the ‘normality’ of the ‘good’ and responsible 
outsider subject, along similar lines used in defining the heter-
onormative subject (Schippert 2011, 77). Within communities 
of color already marginalized by the edifice of white supremacy, 
this general idea serves as a helpful reminder when establishing 
our participation in an expansive humanity. We should be care-
ful not to erect new norms and classifications that further vilify 
perceivable deviant “others,” specifically in gendered, racialized, 
class-marked, or sexual terms. Furthermore, as I have argued 
elsewhere, any conceivable notion of our common humanity 
will be ontologically enmeshed and entangled with other forms 
of natural life. In keeping with the tenets of religious naturalism, 
we consistently resist the aims of traditional humanism that 
have posited humans outside of myriad nature and eclipsed the 
interrelatedness of all natural processes.
Those of us inspired by this queer African-American reli-
gious naturalism recognize the inclination in humans to insti-
tutionalize our reified constructions as normative views of truth 
or standards of practice. Whatever principles we deem sacred 
or effective in shaping our desires can never be divorced from 
cultural constructions, social/political contexts, and institu-
tionalizing processes. However, in seeking to reorder “issues 
concerning identities, nationalism, communities, and material 
practices,” we remain open to newer forms of becoming (Schip-
pert 2011, 76). In short, achieving our humanity remains an 
ongoing, critical task — we never arrive. The queer religiosity 
I outline here accentuates this point. Furthermore, employing 
the metaphors of pores (openings), it accentuates the fluidity of 
purportedly fixed (or given) differences. Here, queer religiosity 
seeks to illuminate the porous nature of fixed markers that pur-
port to reveal our identities (e.g., race, sexuality, and gender), 
to emplace our bodies (e.g., institutions, buildings, nations, and 
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borders), and to specify our locations (e.g., cultural, geographic, 
social-economic). 
Finally, this emerging African-American religious natural-
ism evokes Baldwin’s concept of redemptive embodied love, 
which he introduced to inspire and challenge his contempo-
raries to conceive and hope beyond what seemed immediate 
and obvious. In the contemporary era, queer religious prac-
tice finds all Americans confronting and rejecting ideologies 
that perpetually bifurcate our humanity, and instill a shameful 
sense of inferiority and unworthiness in some and a false sense 
of superiority in others. Focusing upon the variegated beauty 
that evolution has wrought, we celebrate our differences even 
while honoring our common humanity. Equally important, we 
unhinge problematic stigmas of unnaturalness, illegitimacy, or 
even freakishness from our engagement with others as we ex-
plore nomadic human desire. 
Here, Baldwin’s prophetic words in The Price of the Ticket are 
apropos: “Go back to where you started, or as far back as you 
can, examine all of it, travel your road again and tell the truth 
about it. Sing or shout or testify or keep it to yourself: but know 
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Irreverent Theology:  
On the Queer Ecology of Creation
Jacob J. Erickson
Nature is infinitely scandalous!
 — Isabella Rossellini
All this would entail, in the larger scheme of things, 
an irreverent turn in ecocriticism…
 — Nicole Seymour
Scandalizing Nature and God
“How did Noah do it?” the Italian-American actress Isabella 
Rossellini asks inquisitively. She is dressed in black, stands in 
front of a similar black background, and holds in her right hand 
a yellow umbrella. “How did he manage to organize all animals,” 
she asks you, “into couples?”1 Rossellini poses this question in 
the course of a series of hilarious and provocative short films 
produced for the Sundance Channel on the theme of Green 
Porno. In the course of those films, she artistically explores the 
complexities of animal sex, performing a variety of animal spe-




cies and exploring their sexual quirks, oddities, and pleasures. 
As she describes the series in the book inspired by her project, 
“I imagine myself as a particular animal and make love as that 
animal would. Each film is scientifically accurate; nature is infi-
nitely scandalous” (Rossellini 2009).
Infinitely scandalous nature is precisely the odd focus of Ros-
sellini’s peculiar film about the biblical story of Noah. She ob-
serves that God calls pairs of animals into Noah’s ark precisely to 
sexually reproduce, to repopulate the earth, to “be fruitful and 
multiply” after the mythic flood. But, as Rossellini goes on to 
show, such a task is biologically fraught.
The scene’s imagination expands: a large pop-up book Holy 
Bible opens and out emerges the biblical story. A cloud, rain, and 
lightning appear above the wooden ark while God’s arm — Ros-
sellini’s arm with hair drawn in marker all over — scrutinizes 
the animals entering the ark two by two.2 First, elephants climb 
the boarding ramp — genitals prominently on display, male and 
female. Following the elephants, however, is a lone earthworm, 
and the situation gets complicated:
“You!” God accuses. “Why are you alone?”
“I’m an earthworm. I am an hermaphrodite.” Rossellini 
replies, in the guise of her earthwormed costume. “I’m both 
male and female. To reproduce, I can mate with another her-
maphrodite, or I can segment my body and clone myself.”
The human Rossellini reappears, asking quizzically, 
“What did Noah do with hermaphrodite animals? What did 
Noah do with transsexual animals?”
2 The flood narrative in Genesis is, of course, a complicated text in and of 
itself — woven together strands of the Yahwist and Priestly creation narra-
tives. Rossellini’s treatment of the Noah story misses a number of crucial 
details of the actual story — most that it is commonly held that in the Priest-
ly version of the story two of every kind of animal are taken onto the ark, 
whereas in Yahwist version of the story, seven pairs of all clean animals and 
a pair of all unclean animals are taken. The intertextual difference is quite 
often overlooked, though this difference in the text would little change the 
reality of Rossellini’s argument. See Genesis 6–11 for the flood story.
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And the piece spirals on — hermaphrodite animals, animals 
that change sex, animals that transition sex and sexuality, par-
thenogenetic species that reproduce asexually all appear on the 
boarding plank up to Noah’s ark, making complicated God’s 
command that only “one male and one female” be allowed on 
the ark.
The short film concludes with a biological provocation that 
extends beyond the scope of the biblical myth she reenacts. Ros-
sellini asks, “How did Noah do it — hermaphrodite, transves-
tites, transgender, transsexuals, polygamy, monogamy, homo-
sexual, bisexual — how could it all be heterosexual?” And the 
sound of rain pours on… 
“How could it all be heterosexual?” The question seems in-
nocuous enough, but the inquiry opens a veritable can of her-
maphroditic worms. On the surface level the question begins 
to subvert the literal logics of the religious narrative. Taken on 
its own terms, the story of Noah’s flood is an impossible one, 
mythic in its telling, upended by the biological facts of life. That 
upending, for Rossellini, also seems to attempt an upending of 
the social and theological forces that often read biblical texts in 
an overtly literalistic manner. Such theological viewpoints often 
contribute to a rhetoric celebrating and assuming heterosexual 
life and relationships as norm. Those theological viewpoints of-
ten scapegoat queer lives by calling them deviant. By lifting up 
biological oddities in a strange kind of midrashic retelling of the 
flood story, Rossellini’s questions subtly challenge the assump-
tions of broader heterosexist theologies and hermeneutics.
The film also serves to subvert our cultural assumptions 
about everyday biology. Animal life is not divided into hetero-
sexual pairs, and the diversity of animal sex and sexuality mul-
tiplies in strange and surprising ways. What biologists may take 
for granted about the queer sexual pleasures and reproductive 
lives of the animal kingdom, viewers are suddenly reminded of 
or confronted by. Not only are preconceptions of religious story-
telling to be rethought, but also Rossellini exposes heterosexist 
assumptions projected onto nonhuman life through an ecologi-
cal parade of animal sex and sexualities.
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At this point, we might deduce yet another subversion. If nei-
ther assumptions of scripture nor projections of biology fully 
encapsulate actual life, then what about the question implicates 
human beings? Not all of human reality — yours, mine — is het-
erosexual, despite the assumptions of heterosexism structuring 
various oppressive regimes. The analogy is such — if animals, in 
their sexual and biological diversity, are more complex than a 
certain reading of the biblical text indicates, might not the sexu-
ality of human animals be more complex as well? Might human 
beings themselves corporealize a diversity of sexes, sexualities, 
genders, and relationships?
Rossellini’s art is playfully irreverent of theological and bio-
logical imagination; indeed its irreverent of human imaginings 
of the ecological world. Her performances expose the viewer’s 
assumptions about what constitutes theological culture, what 
constitutes what is “natural,” and further exposes how deeply 
implicated culture and nature are together. Her art and the ques-
tions her art raises makes it possible for the viewer to reconceive 
their ecological world, their religious expectations, or their un-
derstanding of what it means to be a human being all together. 
The theological, the erotic, and the human all entangle one 
another in assumptions shaping attentiveness and negligence 
of actual planetary life. If animal sexuality (if we can use that 
phrase at all) is far more complex than is often assumed, what 
does that mean for theological reflection, ecological relation-
ships, or human life and responsibility for nonhuman life?
It’s true, talking about “queer ecology” might conjure up 
strange rumors of gay penguins or evoke bestial accusations 
against queer communities. But for the last few decades an 
emerging theoretical conversation between environmental eth-
ics and queer theory — like Rossellini’s art — has been stirring up 
new perspectives on the constructed boundaries of nature and 
culture, animality and humanity, ecological responsibility and 
environmental degradation. Recent volumes entitled Queering 
the Non/Human and Queer Ecologies examine everything from 
biophilia to Brokeback Mountain, eros to starfish, and repro-
duction to bunny rabbits (with the latter not being a very large 
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leap).3 As Timothy Morton summarizes in his influential piece, 
“Ecology and queer theory are intimate. It’s not that ecological 
thinking would benefit from an injection of queer theory from 
the outside. It’s that, fully and properly, ecology is queer theory 
and queer theory is ecology: queer ecology” (Morton 2010, 281).
Scholars of religion, theologians and ethicists, both antici-
pated and followed this turn in the nineties by incorporating 
religious perspectives with lesbian and gay liberation, queer 
theory and ecological ethics. A number of ecofeminists, theolo-
gians like J. Michael Clark, and ethicists like Daniel T. Spencer 
provided insightful analyses of the twin ghettoization of LGTBQ 
voices and the earth. They point towards, as Spencer describes, 
the “self-contradictory positions of condemning lesbians and 
gay men for being both ‘unnatural’ (where natural sexuality is 
read as procreative heterosexuality) and ‘too close to nature’ 
in the sense of homosexual behavior being ‘lower’ or ‘animal-
istic’ and outside the boundaries of acceptable human culture” 
(Spencer 1996, 80–81). In this way, these scholars focused on the 
fraught eco-social and material dimensions of queer and eco-
logical voices.
My own goal in this chapter seeks to further this remark-
able interdisciplinary conversation in an odd theological key 
by engaging the recent work of feminist philosopher of science, 
Karen Barad. Barad’s writing is key, I think, for mutually-en-
hancing and collaborating the insights of queer theory, philoso-
phies of science, and ecology. Particularly, I stage an encounter 
between Barad’s concept of “posthumanist performativity” and 
the sixteenth-century reformer and monk Martin Luther’s pe-
3 For earlier attempts at a queer ecotheology, see the multiple trends of eco-
feminism and ecowomanism, as well as: Clark 1993; Spencer 1996. Along-
side the work of Clark or Spencer, see the growing bodies of queer eco-
logical literature (the following are listed chronologically): Gaard 1997; the 
work of the journal Undercurrents; Stein 2004; Barad 2007; Giffney and 
Hird 2008; Alaimo 2010; Morton 2010; Mortimer-Sandilands and Erickson 
2010; Halberstam 2011; Johnson 2011; Azzarello 2012; Boer 2012; Chen 2012; 
Roughgarden 2013; Seymour 2013; Ahmed 2014; the chapter on Walt Whit-
man in Keller 2015; and Keller and Rubenstein 2017.
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culiar understanding of the incarnation of Spirit in Creation. 
I do so to begin to construct a queer ecotheology where Lu-
ther’s passion for incarnation, critically reimagined with Barad’s 
work, offers the potential for a queer incarnation of divinity 
where that divinity is caught up — even plays several roles — in 
the performative indeterminacy of the earth and of the cosmos. 
In the irreverent slippage of God and earth, “creation” signals a 
divinely queer ecology.4
The Irreverent Collaborations of Queer Ecology
Rossellini’s short film is just a finite glimpse into what is pos-
sible in the infinitely scandalous interrelations of theology, ecol-
ogy, and sexuality. What follows in my theological writing is a 
fragile, playful, expansive hope for theology that wishes to take 
our contemporary planetary crises seriously in their depths of 
life and death. What follows is a fragile, playful hope that queer 
bodies, queer failures and pleasures, and queer play and hope 
might offer some distinctive imagination to ecological theolo-
gies as they attempt to think on a dying planet — at least a planet 
dying, for the first time, at the hands of human beings. What 
follows is nothing more than a creative hunch, a speculative 
possibility of flesh. What follows is nothing more than a playful 
caress of theology. My flirtation is that ecological theology is, or 
can be, a poetry and practice of irreverent criticism, of irrever-
ence to conceptual realities overwhelmed by ecological crises.
In arguing for theological irreverence, I am constructively 
rallying to and riffing off of ecocritic Nicole Seymour’s call for 
what she calls an “irreverent ecocriticism,” a kind of criticism 
“whose inquiries are absurd, perverse, humorous in character, 
and/or focused on the absurd, perverse, and humorous as they 
arise in relationship to ecology and representations thereof ” 
(Seymour 2012, 57). Given the state of environmental collapse, 
the continuous reports of ecological devastation, and multiply-
4 I use the terminology of “earth” here to signify not any kind of foundation-
alist ground, but a kind of nominalization of dynamic planetarity.
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ing effects of global warming, she asks how we might continue 
in our ecological work. How might we go forward given the 
deep helplessness and hopelessness of our current milieu?
Drawing on contemporary, poststructuralist thought and 
queer ecology, Seymour argues for an irreverent turn that 
“would allow us to address and grapple with […] those emo-
tional and conceptual pressures we face” (Seymour 2012, 61). As 
she notes, there’s “something laughable, even hilarious, about 
the collective position of the ecocritic in the face of ongoing en-
vironmental devastation. Rather than ignore that hilarity,” she 
continues, “I want us to talk about it” (Seymour 2012, 68). To 
talk about that hilarity, Seymour argues, focuses on our awk-
ward dispositions, affects, silly constructions, ideas, and low 
culture that may, in fact, offer political ways of feeling out the 
undeniable ambiguity and uncertainty of the current moment. 
Irreverence might be a way of materially navigating the difficult 
absurdities of our current moment while still committing our-
selves to the political and ethical possibilities ecocritical writing 
often (absurdly) desires.
Still, irreverence seems innocuous, too, at first. The phrase 
sounds like I’m simply not taking my theological work seriously 
enough. I may be coyly joking about God, giggling in church, 
or scandalizing theological language. But, perhaps, you may as-
sume that by irreverence I’m intentionally trying to destroy or 
disrespect theology or practices of faith (only certain kinds). 
Disrespect is hardly my intention, though I most certainly flirt 
with such danger. In point of fact, my imagination is seduced by 
an irreverent faith and an irreverent reflection of faith. 
Even more, however, my own desire for an irreverent ecocrit-
icism is aimed at nothing less than the most revered: “Nature” 
and “God.”5 Two ontotheological concepts — two sovereign sub-
jects imagined and imaged in the Modern era — utterly distant 
5 The complication here, of course, is that the celebration of the concept of 
“Nature” as uncivilized land, empty land, and ordered land instigated a level 
of ecological degradation never before seen on the face of the earth — so 
much so that we now find ourselves in a planet irrevocably shaped by the 
plunder, violence, and ecocolonialism of human animals.
62
meaningful flesh
from the actual textures of planetary, earthly life but with cata-
strophic effects upon that life. On one hand: “God”, the word 
that evokes assumptions of omnipotent control; “God”, the as-
sumed distant creator and providential controller of all that is; 
“God” imaged in masculine — even “straight” — terms; “God,” 
who remains unaffected by earthly life and the chaotic fecundi-
ties of creation. On the other hand, far apart from “God”: “Na-
ture,” the wild that is distantly “out there somewhere”; “Nature,” 
like God, is set apart from human living, yet set apart to be 
tamed and conquered by human “Culture”; “Nature,” the eternal 
laws that shape creation, properly ordered and straight. What is 
human “Nature,” we might ask? And the answer that seized con-
trol for the past centuries is that of a straight, white, European 
male — imago Dei in its most anthropocentric guises (Erickson 
2015).
What we’re wrestling with, then, is static notions of “Nature” 
and “God.” And yet those notions are entwined, pale reflections 
of each other, ordering and sanctioning the devastation of life in 
the Anthropocene — we might call it the “Androcene,” we might 
call it the “Heterocene.” Put another way, I may be critiquing 
precisely what Laurel C. Schneider calls the “logic of the One” 
or talking about Marcella Althaus-Reid’s “indecent theology” 
in a consciously ecological key (Schneider 2007; Althaus-Reid 
2002).
My irreverence, then, glances back and subtly rolls its eyes at 
this construction of “God” and this vision of “Nature” together. 
It offers a perverse seduction in asking new questions: How can 
one speak passionately of the divine after “God”? How to speak 
of the complex desires of our planetary life after “Nature”? How 
can we theologically reflect on the actual ecologies and loves of 
this planet? Can we love the soil with more wild abandon? What 
kind of earthy language do we seduce?
Such a love would be a queer proposition, but perhaps this 
irreverence is done with a kind of divine passion — a passion 
precisely for the scandalous love that cannot, in fact, be revered 
appropriately. Reverence would be business as usual. Rever-
ence would miss the longing of our own flesh and the longing 
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flesh of divinity. To revere, we might say, is to capture, to be 
able to identify the object of our reverence, to be able to identify 
the strange relationships, genders, creatures, and divinity that 
make the planet what it is. To enforce reverence in our present 
day and age is to enforce a respect for tradition, a respect for 
“the way things are,” a respect for nature “out there” which we 
are most certainly not part of but might appreciate. To revere 
is to not question what has gone before; “God” and “Nature” 
are sacred — don’t mess with them. Sadly, reverence has lost all 
etymological sense of “awe” (Rubenstein 2010). In that sense, 
I might say that my theological reflection attempts to reopen 
or stir afresh the clogged senses of queer wonder in the world. 
Again, my fragile hunch is that sexuality, ecology, and divinity 
are all intimately implicated in each other, every other, and that 
a queer ecotheology should put that threesome in awkward and 
strange positions, some of them potentially unorthodox. What 
follows theologically is thought experiment — a conceptual pos-
sibility — that attempts just that. To do so, we turn to one of the 
most important contemporary figures in queer ecology and 
feminist philosophy of science.
“Nature”: Karen Barad’s Posthumanist Performativity
In her 2007 book, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum 
Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning, Karen 
Barad sets out to deploy a theory of what she calls “agential re-
alism,” an “epistemological-ontological-ethical framework that 
provides an understanding of the role of human and nonhu-
man, material and discursive, and natural and cultural factors 
in scientific and other social material practices” (Barad 2007, 
26). She charts a middle way through multiple binary tensions 
of construing the world through a creative exploration of the 
quantum philosophy-physics of Niels Bohr. From Bohr, Barad 
argues a number of salient ontological points. 
Primarily, she argues that, “individually determinate enti-
ties do not exist, measurements do not entail an interaction 
between separate entities; rather, determinate entities emerge 
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from their intra-action” (Barad 2007, 128). Said in another way, 
creatures are not isolated entities — “Nature” somewhere “out 
there” — but phenomena of intra-active agencies. Relations al-
ways precede entities; difference and distinction are rooted in 
the intra-activity of previous, multiple relations. And because 
entities, creatures, emerge and become from multiply occurring 
intra-activities, their being is always indeterminate, at the end of 
the day, becoming, and open to change. Matter, creatures, and 
the like are dynamic, agentic, and open to possibility.
Barad is attempting to disrupt what she views as a misguided 
turn and reductive impulse in recent constructivist philosophy. 
“Language has been granted too much power,” she laments. 
“Why are language and culture granted their own agency and 
historicity, while matter is figured passive and immutable or at 
best inherits a potential for change derivatively from language 
and culture?” (Barad 2007, 131). Barad is not alone in this effort. 
A number of other voices like Vicky Kirby, Stacy Alaimo, and 
Jane Bennett echo Barad’s concerns (often directly referencing 
her) that thought about matter really doesn’t take the agencies 
and creative processes of materiality seriously (Alaimo 2010; 
Kirby 2011; Bennett 2010). 
But it’s the particular conceptual creativity of Barad that fires 
my imagination here. Indeed, she finds a strong, fundamen-
tal resonance between an indeterminate material agency with 
queer performativity — queer performativity as elucidated by a 
number of scholars of drag and in the oft-cited work of Judith 
Butler. Most of us have heard some iteration of Butler’s argu-
ment or another, where gender is not an inherent trait or on-
tological fixity but rather an indeterminate process, a doing, a 
kind of deep praxis citing, interpolating histories and assump-
tions about gender and in their very citation opening the pos-
sibility for subverting those very gender assumptions.
Barad insightfully finds both material promise and critique 
in this concept. She argues that, “Performativity, properly con-
strued, is not an invitation to turn everything (including mate-
rial bodies) into words; on the contrary, performativity is pre-
cisely a contestation of the excessive power granted to language 
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to determine what is real” (Barad 2007, 133). Here, Barad turns 
to Judith Butler’s book Bodies that Matter, where Butler strug-
gles to theorize the slippery matter of the body (Butler 1993). 
Barad argues that here, “Butler’s reconceptualization of matter 
as a process of materialization brings to the fore the importance 
of recognizing matter in its historicity and directly challenges 
representationalism’s construal of matter as a passive and blank 
slate” (Barad 2007, 150). Again, performativity assumes a ‘pro-
cess of materialization’, where matter is involved in the becom-
ing of bodies all the way down as a ‘congealing of agencies’.
Still, Barad argues that Butler misses a fundamental point: 
“while [Butler] correctly calls for the recognition of matter’s 
historicity, ironically, she seems to assume that it is ultimately 
derived (yet again) from the agency of language or culture. She 
fails to recognize matter’s dynamism” (Barad 2007, 64). Butler 
(at least in her early work, I might add) seems to too thinly 
theorize a crucial dimension to the materialization of bodies, 
those complex agencies of matter itself. Barad continues that, 
“it would seem that any robust theory of the materialization of 
bodies would necessarily take account of how the body’s materi-
ality (including, for example, its anatomy and physiology) and 
other material forces as well (including nonhuman ones) actively 
matter to the process of materialization” (Barad 2007, 65). Not 
only do bodies offer resistance to representation (as Butler along 
with Foucault admits), but “natural” matter contributes in rich 
ways and participates in the constitution of cultural formation 
and practice. Climate change and global warming are perfect 
examples of this phenomena, where human cultural-material 
practices and unruly matter intra-act together in the tragic dev-
astation of our current sense of the planet.
In turning to “matters of practices, doings, and actions,” 
Barad argues that performativity composes a nature-cultural 
perspective on material production. She argues this active sense 
of matter as a “posthumanist performative approach to under-
standing techno-scientific and other nature-cultural practices 
that specifically acknowledge and take account of matter’s dyna-
mism” (Barad 2007, 135). Matter is, in Barad’s words, “an active 
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participant in the world’s becoming, in its ongoing intra-activi-
ty” (Barad 2007, 136).
In a 2011/2012 article, “Nature’s Queer Performativity,” Barad 
reiterates the queer dimensions of her argument in Meeting the 
Universe Halfway. She notes the importance of the concept of 
performativity for queer theory and then criticizes typical uses 
of the concept for remaining rooted in an anthropocentric vi-
sion of the world, noting that “human exceptionalism are odd 
scaffoldings on which to build a theory that is specifically in-
tended to account for matters of abjection and the differential 
construction of the human, especially when gradations of hu-
manness, including inhumanness, are often constituted in re-
lation to nonhumans” (Barad 2012, 30). A reader might hear 
resonances in Barad’s writing here with Spencer’s earlier obser-
vation of the contradictory logic of queers as both “unnatural” 
and “animalistic” in passion.
Barad highlights the strange phenomenal relations and en-
tanglements of what she delightfully calls “queer critters” — of 
lightning strikes, receptor cells in stingrays, phiesteria (a dino-
flagellate responsible for the mass killings of marine life — think, 
red tide), and atoms — all of which are ontologically indetermi-
nate in behavior and occurrence. The queer reality of nature, 
here again, is that creaturely performances are different from 
one occurrence to the next. One burst of lightning strikes com-
pletely differently than another in the communication of the at-
mosphere and the ground. Lightning performs differently as the 
material conditions of atmosphere differently become in time 
and space and as others (in our case, humans) intra-actively ob-
serve these phenomena.
Queer critters are particular phenomena, bursting relations 
that congeal differently, but in that very congealing create a dif-
ference to be respected. Barad notes the “‘posthumanist’ point 
is not to blur the boundaries between human and nonhuman, 
not to cross out all distinctions and differences, and not to sim-
ply invert humanism, but rather to understand the materializ-
ing effects of particular ways of drawing boundaries between 
‘humans’ and ‘nonhumans’” (Barad 2012, 31). For those of you 
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familiar, Barad is deeply sympathetic here to Jacques Derrida’s 
concern in The Animal That Therefore I Am that we not wipe 
out all the differences between creatures, between humans and 
animals, but multiply them.6
Matter’s indeterminate performance, Barad notes, is some-
thing worldly kin to deconstruction. The histories and memo-
ries of these multiple critters multiply just as the world turns. 
And they trace lines, leave traces, in the multiply repeating 
iterative intra-activity of world. Memory in the movement of 
posthumanist performativity, Barad writes, is the “pattern of 
sedimented enfoldings of iterative intra-activity.” “The world,” she 
continues, “is its memory (enfolded materialization)” (Barad 
2012, 44). We might say that this “world of becoming,” to bor-
row a phrase from political theorist William Connolly, holds a 
deep geo-philosophical memory that holds subtle traces of the 
world’s performative shenanigans (Connolly 2010).
“God”: Martin Luther’s Masks of the Divine 
And so, we come to the more irreverent theological shenani-
gans. With a queer cloud of witnesses in Rossellini, Seymour, 
and Barad in memory propelling us forward, I want to take a 
queer turn here too and briefly cite the material of the tower-
ing figure of my own tradition — Martin Luther. I desire to cite 
and seduce his incarnational theology of creation away from its 
own moorings into conversation with Barad’s thought to think 
through the possibility of what I might unimaginatively call 
ecotheological performativity. Many queer theorists note the 
kind of theatricality that ‘performativity’ evokes — for good and 
ill — and I want to dangerously risk eliding a concept of post-
humanist performativity with one theatrical metaphor of per-
6 As Derrida writes, “Everything I’ll say will consist, certainly not in effacing 
the limit, but in multiplying its figures, in complicating, thickening, delin-
earizing, folding, and dividing the line precisely by making it increase and 
multiply” (Derrida 2008, 29).
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formance beautifully riddled with theological and incarnational 
implications. 
A number of ecotheologians and ethicists have previously 
turned to Luther’s thought to shake out an ecotheological prom-
ise from it. In the now classic Earth Community, Earth Ethics, 
Larry Rasmussen points towards an ecological glimmer in Lu-
ther and the Lutheran Dietrich Bonhoeffer “that the finite bears 
the infinite and the transcendent is utterly immanent (finitum 
capax infiniti)” and that, in what Rasmussen calls an “earth-
bound theology,” “God is pegged to the earth. So if you would 
experience God, you must fall in love with earth” (Rasmussen 
1996, 272–73).
These binary languages of transcendence and immanence, 
finiteness and infinity, are notoriously difficult, of course, but 
what intrigues me is that this theological commitment leads to, 
as Rasmussen notes, “Luther’s image of the ‘masks of God’ (lar-
vae dei) or God’s ‘wrapping’ (involucrum)” (Rasmussen 1996, 
279). Creatures, according to Luther, are incarnational masks 
of the divine, divinity enfolded in the stuff of the earth. These 
larval masks both reveal divine immanence in the world, Lu-
ther notes, and reserve a kind of terrible hiddenness of a divine 
who, in some traditions, one cannot see face-to-face and live. 
So creatures function as a mask, a concrete instantiation for the 
incarnation of divinity where both nearness and alterity func-
tion together. It’s almost as if, for Luther, the divine is caught 
up in a kind of queer performativity of the earth, and desires to 
play, revel in it.
In his most recent book, Earth-honoring Faith, Rasmussen 
reiterates and catalogs some of these moments of ecotheological 
promise from the span of Martin Luther’s writings: 
For [Luther], ‘the finite bears the infinite’; nature’s creatures 
are God’s ‘masks’ or, in another image, the ‘wrappings’ and 
trappings of God. God’s presence fills ‘all things, even the ti-
niest leaf ’ and ‘every little seed.’ Not only is the divine wholly 
present ‘in a grain, on a grain, over a grain,’ Luther even finds 
the very ‘footprints’ of God in those of a mouse. They have 
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‘such pretty feet and delicate hair,’ he says (Rasmussen 2012, 
198). 
Luther’s writing and theology becomes a basis for reorient-
ing theological attention to the earth. Divinity is immanently 
enfolded in the stuff of the earth; divinity curled infinite and 
infinitesimal in the unruly and strange forces and agencies of 
creaturely life. Such creation mysticism asks that we reflect on 
the topsy-turvy material conversations we are in divine creativ-
ity. As Rossellini earlier conversed with the imagined and real 
animals of Noah’s ark, Luther’s human creatures converse with 
all creatures in odd ways, and those creatures are indwelt with 
divinity. “Christians,” Luther writes, “hold converse with trees 
and all else that grows on earth, and the latter, in turn, with 
them.”7 The finite and the infinite wrap around each other, and 
the edges blur or transfigure.
Theo-ethicist Cynthia Moe-Lobeda picks up this same tra-
jectory of unexpected divine indwelling in mystical, Christo-
logical, and ethical directions. She points to a more elemental 
passage in Luther where he writes that “All creatures are […] 
permeable and present to Christ […]. Christ fills all things, 
Christ is around us and in us in all places. He is present in all 
creatures, and I might find him in stone, in fire, in water” (Moe-
Lobeda 2010, 207). Such indwelling, Moe-Lobeda argues, serves 
to highlight the multiplicity of divine agency, different modes of 
divine action in the earth — creative, revelatory, teaching, sav-
ing, sustaining, and empowering (if elusive in strange) divine 
relation.8
Both Rasmussen and Moe-Lobeda, then, find glimmers of 
this ecological Luther, unsurprisingly, in Luther’s sacramental 
writings on the incarnation, especially in a 1527 piece called 
7 For unearthing this quote, I am indebted to Churchill 1999. See also Clough 
2009.
8 Moe-Lobeda writes, more specifically, “Earth embodies God, not only as 
creative and revelatory presence, but also as teaching, saving, sustaining, 




“That These Words of Christ, ‘This is my body,’ etc., Still Stand 
Firm Against the Fanatics” (Of course it would be called that). 
Here Luther writes the paradoxical masks of God where di-
vinity is “completely and entirely present in every single body, 
every creature and object everywhere, and on the other hand, 
must and can be nowhere, beyond and above all creatures and 
objects” (Luther 1961, 60). While Luther, at the end of the day, 
still privileges a kind of all powerful, omni-God, we have to ac-
knowledge that this is no straightforward utter transcendence 
or accessible immanence, but a complex, paradoxical enfolding 
of the two towards, at least, a kind of carnivalesque panentheism 
where divinity occurs in a number of guises.
We might call Luther’s theological disposition to see crea-
tures as masks of divinity as a hybrid methodological species, 
a theo-ethico-onto-epistemology, or a theo-ethical disposition 
in creation. Martin Luther’s writing itself is performative, carni-
valesque, sometimes unethical to contemporary minds.9 But Ví-
tor Westhelle notes that Luther approaches theological language 
with a “burlesque attitude,” and that, “With his language, Luther 
brought the carnival to academia, to the pulpit, to the square, 
breaking down the disciplined frontiers in which these utter-
ances were allowed” (Westhelle 2016, 33). Westhelle surmises 
that “[the mask trope] touched the people’s imagery in which 
the mask had a very concrete and popular significance […] the 
popular burlesque of carnivals, not however in the feast of fools, 
where it would be routine, but rather in the interdicted space of 
the pulpit, of academia, and of publications” (Westhelle 2016, 
33–34). Luther’s writing itself messes with rigid boundaries of 
specialized academia and the theology of everyday life. It evokes 
the queer instabilities of those boundaries. And that incarnate 
instability in the tones of Luther’s writing might, in fact, per-
form a poetics of the flesh, a carnivalesque way divinity relates 
to the mysterious depths of creation itself (Rivera 2015).




Those instabilities work themselves into the slippages of a po-
tential ecological vision of planetary life that might both cherish 
ecological life and take seriously the very real losses planetary 
life wracks up in natural disasters, predatory relationships, and 
natural selection. In her “From Cross to Tree of Life: Creation as 
God’s Mask,” theologian Wanda Deifelt writes that “If we speak 
of creation as God’s mask, creation both reveals God’s presence 
and conceals it. It contains both the pleasurable and hurtful” 
(Deifelt 2013, 170). Deifelt riffs on some of Westhelle’s work on 
the larvae dei and what those masks mean for creaturely life. The 
masks that proliferate in the wild, so to speak, “Because God 
escapes our understanding, we are prevented from domesticat-
ing God and limiting the divine to the aspects of creation that 
please and appease us” (Deifelt 2013, 170). Divinity might occur 
in unexpected relations, in the wake of ecological devastations 
just as much as in the beauty of a scene. The wrapping of divin-
ity means that human beings cannot simply “see” divine masks 
where convenient. She writes, “We cannot just select creation as 
God’s mask because of its beauty, but also because it contains 
aspects of divine relation we can’t fully grasp” (Deifelt 2013, 171). 
Slippages of creatorliness and creatureliness abound.
For Deifelt however, the inability to domesticate divinity 
is also deeply ethical. The masks of divinity occur in scorched 
places, in the faces of endangered creatures, in biodiversity loss, 
in the ravages of the Anthropocene. Theologically reflecting 
the masks of divinity entails reflection on the pathos, passion, 
compassion, and pain that go along with ecological crises today. 
“To say that creation is God’s mask and that creation is in pain 
(Romans 8) is to say that also God is in pain” (Deifelt 2013, 174). 
Acknowledging that pain simultaneously lures theology into 
compassionate understanding, ethical responsibility, breathing 




Larval Divinity, Carnivalesque Panentheism
German Luther scholar Hans-Martin Barth writes that, in Lu-
ther’s theology, “Believers assert that all creatures are masks and 
costumes God chooses to cooperate with God, even though 
God ‘can and does do everything without their cooperation.’” 
Barth then exclaims, “God conceals Godself, dresses, wears 
costumes!” (Barth 2013, 108). This Barth is very excited at this 
divine fashion show. And I think we can seduce this costuming 
God, this dress into a kind of cosmic drag show, where divinity 
intra-acts, performs with the deep materiality of the becoming 
of the world. Creation is Divinity in drag. Divinity lures a pas-
sion for carnival, for creaturely burlesque.
I think this metaphorical life of earthy, creaturely masks, lar-
vae dei, offers the possibility for thinking divinity and creation 
in the key of posthumanist performativity. Incarnation occurs 
in the midst of complex material agencies, luring them on in 
mutual process of transformation. I might say here that instead 
of enacting any straight forward account of incarnation — a 
one-to-one correlation of a determinate divinity intimately be-
coming determinate flesh — I’m advocating something more 
like a nature-cultural “intra-carnation,” where the divine and 
creatures enflesh together, are wrapped together, open possi-
bilities of becoming differently, are fundamentally indetermi-
nate, and appreciate responsibility to the multiplicity of divine-
creaturely masks. Drag shows, carnivals, burlesque only occur 
in the creative flow and intra-active participation of performer 
and spectator. And those masks quite often become blurred or 
change roles.
Barad’s intra-activity might then challenge Luther’s sense of 
holding on to God’s independent action and unilateral choice in 
creation. Or Barad’s intra-activity may expand the more radi-
cal impulses of Luther’s burlesque, expand the possibility where 
Divinity dresses, wears costumes precisely because the world 
seduces divinity to, transforms divinity in the infinitesimal be-
comings of the world. As a number of ecological thinkers have 
rightly pointed out, an omnipotent God who unilaterally shapes 
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the matter of creation simply re-performs an anthropocentric 
logic of human mastery over passive nature. And perpetuates 
that logic in lived ecologies.
We might take the contemporary, biological meaning of 
“larval” and apply it to these divine, incarnational masks. Di-
vine performance in the world is always an unfinished memo-
ry, a trace, a gestating, changing possibility of metamorphosis 
though indeterminate material agencies of the cosmos. Earth is 
the materialization of divine memory and eschatology as well. 
In a view of ecotheological performativity, divinity becomes a 
“queer critter” seducing other queer critters’ disturbing loves 
and ever-new queer responsibilities.10 Relational responsibility 
for the show proliferates in the planet and leaves traces for good 
and ill in the memories of planetary flesh.
Divine incarnation of spirit, then, occurs convivially: in, 
with, and under the messiness of this queer earth — tragedy, 
rainbows, biodiverse arks and all. It might be that creatures are 
wrapped up in biodiverse performances of divinity, that divinity 
is wrapped up in creatures, divinity intra-acting in water, fire, 
soil, and air. These performances are the ecotheological ver-
sion of guerilla theater or guerilla gardening; divinity bursts 
and becomes in the most unexpected, elemental places, stirring 
up new possibilities for relationality, speaking back in scorched 
spaces, and seducing creatures in a fleshy display of queer play. 
And so perhaps, playfully, we need a new recognition of our 
intellectual and embodied heritages as well: Theology is irrev-
erent, particularly in its attempts to speak of divinity, a depth 
of which constantly lures us to rework, refold, and remake our 
10 Joan Roughgarden concludes that the story of Noah’s ark, at the end of the 
day, might urge us to cherish queer biodiversities. She writes that, “the well-
known story of Noah’s ark imparts a moral imperative to conserve all bio-
diversity, both across species and within species” (Roughgarden 2013, 9). I 
read the story as being a bit more complicated than that statement, ecocriti-
cally. The indeterminacy of the place of animal life in the Noah stories is 
dubious — the Noahic covenant is made with “all flesh” and simultaneously 
much animal life dies, is sacrificed, or is sanctioned to be sacrificed at hu-
man hands. But her point and ethical stance is well-taken.
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categories. Theology is irreverent in logics of God that issue 
from a creation, boundless and unceasing in creativity. The-
ology is irreverent in the ways our analogies bring the unex-
pected together. Our language, speaking of God and creation, 
is carnivalesque, topsy-turvy, performative, animated, vibrant, 
constantly changing shape and drag. Theology produces queer 
ecologies, precisely in attempts of performed utterance, known 
and unknown. Even the most stable or ordinary theologi-
cal constructions contain manifold instabilities. We can never 
speak fully of this divinity related to us, and we can never fully 
exhaust the possibilities of our contextual, ecological speaking 
of the Divine. Theology is irreverent and lures forth responsi-
bilities of wonder and ethical care where we thought they might 
not bloom.
But we cannot stop at outing theology for its irreverence, its 
audacity, its “incantation at the edge of uncertainty,” or in the 
transgressions of that uncertainty (Keller 2003, xviii). We cannot 
stop queerly playing with and subverting the fantasies that fash-
ion our ecological life. That play is not nihilistic or purely chaot-
ic — it wraps us together in masks of divinity and beckons us to 
take on different responsibilities or create new roles. Rossellini’s 
question surfaces again, “How could it all be heterosexual?” My 
hope is to make an eco-moral claim out of this questioning as 
well. For this particular nature-cultural moment, we must be ir-
reverent of old stories and ideas in our constructive creativity. 
Ideas of pristine nature, untouched wilderness, essential selves, 
essential genders, and uncomplicated assumptions of desire and 
sexuality, deaden and violate the messy and embodied realities 
of creativity, embodied ecology, and enfleshed divinity. For the 
masks of divinity absurdly frighten, play, enthrall, tease, seduce, 
and expose love. They ask us to make a playful future together in 
the strange planet shaped in human power. Creatures respond 
in a multiplicity of ways. Creation’s quite the “showmance,” as 
my theater friends say. But the performance is never complete: 
divine larvae are always gestating, becoming something differ-
ent. And, to be frank, that drag show of the divine and the crea-
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turely must go on if we are to live and adapt, mourn, and, dare I 
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A Queerly Theological 
Anthropology of Enchanting 
Animals
Jay Emerson Johnson
An Australian shepherd dog named Tyler illuminated several 
key questions in my work as a Christian theologian, especially 
with respect to theological anthropology. He did this in both 
implicit and explicit ways through the affectionate relationship 
we cultivated over nearly seven years together, which kept rais-
ing paradigm-shifting questions about the human in theological 
systems. Tyler elicited these questions not only about human-
ity’s relationship with God (the traditional description of theo-
logical anthropology) but also about our relationship(s) with 
the wider world of other-than-human animals and the vast net-
work of ecosystems we all share, which in turn ricocheted back 
to theology proper — to God.
More specifically, Tyler helped me appreciate better how var-
ious forms of queer theory — the analysis and critique of sexu-
ally gendered categorizations — could and ought to apply per-
force to humanity’s ongoing classifications of all other animals. 
My care of Tyler and his careful attention towards me, in other 
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words, brought queer theory’s suspicion of binary classification 
schemes to bear on the ostensibly “natural” (read “divinely or-
dained”) division between humans and animals. The relative 
ease with which so many, both scholar and lay, simply assume 
an essential distinction between “human” and “animal” — a dif-
ference most often understood in hierarchical terms — mirrors 
similar assumptions about the sexually gendered categoriza-
tions of the modern West that first prompted queer theory’s 
critical and deconstructive posture.1 That ubiquitous human/
animal divide operates at nearly every level of Christian theo-
logical discourse in much the same way that the homosexual/
heterosexual bifurcation operates at nearly every level of West-
ern cultural discourse, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick persuasively 
argued in her analysis of English literature. For Sedgwick, the 
modern invention of homosexuality has less to do with the sex-
ual identity of a relatively small portion of the human popula-
tion (what she calls the “minoritizing view” of sexuality) than 
with the means to organize (monitor and regulate) the whole 
of Western culture itself, or the “universalizing view.”2 Similarly, 
the putative division between humans and all other animals may 
stem from particular strands of Christian theological doctrine 
(a “minoritizing view,” perhaps) but has shaped a much wider 
range of socio-political assumptions that now carry significant 
implications for planetary ecosystems (most assuredly a “uni-
versalizing view”). 
It is not trivial or merely sentimental that my relationship 
with an Australian shepherd dog refined these questions and 
lent them a peculiar urgency. Tyler and my relationship with 
him actually belonged directly to my theological work, which 
I came to see better because of Marcella Althaus-Reid’s theo-
logical method. She insisted on dismantling the parameters of 
1 For an overview of the emergence and operations of queer theorizing, in-
cluding some of its salient vulnerabilities to critique, see Sullivan, 2003.
2 These views constitute an understanding of sexuality, Sedgwick argues, or-
ganized around a “radical and irreducible incoherence” in which everyone’s 
sexual desires are shaped by a sexual identity that is shared by only a relative 
few (Sedgwick 1990: 85–86).
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“legitimate” academic discourse that had previously made me 
wary of anecdotal or otherwise personal reflections in profes-
sional theological writing and teaching. Althaus-Reid did this 
in the course of her own pioneering work in the confluence of 
feminist, liberation, and queer theological projects. There, she 
brought the erotically gendered character of economics to bear 
on the stalled progress for human freedom and thriving that so 
many liberal Christian communities have sought to champion. 
Those projects stalled in large measure, in her view, because of 
the absurd segregation of theology from the theologian, or the 
detachment of the uniquely embodied (and thus always erotic) 
theologian from theological reflection and scholarship. This seg-
regation and detachment qualify as absurd not only because of 
Christianity’s originating incarnational claim but also because 
such detachment perpetuates (and at times consecrates) the gulf 
between theological ideas and their material effects. Rather than 
eschewing the personal and intimate in our theological endeav-
ors, Althaus-Reid urged us to locate our work precisely there, 
where bodily relationships not only generate thought but also 
especially compel action, and without any contrived appeal to 
modern Western notions of “objectivity” that would absolve 
any of us from taking bodily life (of any kind) as locations for 
encountering Divine Mystery (Althaus-Reid 2003, 8).3 Embold-
ened by her exhortation, I return briefly to Tyler. 
I spent most of every day with Tyler for nearly seven years 
after I rescued him from a shelter when he was nine years old 
(he returned that favor of rescue more than once and in more 
than one way). I adopted him just two years before my elderly 
mother moved in with me, and he taught me on more than one 
occasion what tenderness and compassion look like for those 
who need care, which quite frequently included me. Two weeks 
before his sixteenth birthday and with his health deteriorating, 
3 I suggested ways in which her insights on this might shape the doctrine of 
God (Johnson 2010a); in this present essay I am attempting much the same 
thing but with respect to theological anthropology.
84
meaningful flesh
I made the difficult decision to have him euthanized; Tyler died 
while curled up in my lap.
This personal recounting bears on my academic purpose in 
at least two broad ways. First, my heart broke into a hundred 
little pieces after Tyler’s death. I knew it would be difficult to let 
him go but I had not fully anticipated the gaping hole he would 
leave behind. That empty space has prompted more introspec-
tion and on a wider range of questions than I had expected, even 
more so than when my father died in the late 1980s. To be clear, 
I was close to my father and still miss him a great deal. Why, 
then, would the death of an other-than-human animal provoke 
so much emotional, spiritual, and theological soul-searching? 
Second, the colloquialism I just used about “soul-searching” 
surfaces at least one vexation in dealing theologically with other 
animals: do I have something called a “soul” but Tyler did not? 
That otherwise pedestrian question rose to new heights in pop-
ular culture and on social media platforms after Pope Francis 
appeared to have affirmed an afterlife for our household pets 
and also perhaps many others in the other-than-human-animal 
realm.4 In shorthand fashion, the reporting on the Pope’s re-
marks rehearsed the long train of inquiry into what Christian 
theologians have meant for centuries by claiming that God made 
humanity in God’s own image and likeness (the imago Dei). 
What does such a claim now mean when at nearly every turn 
the latest ethological research strips away yet another attributive 
feature that has been deployed for so long to distinguish, in cat-
egorical fashion, the human animal from the other-than-human 
animal? On what basis or foundation can the binary distinction 
between human and animal still stand in the face of such dwin-
dling empirical support? Do ethological researchers at least tac-
itly embrace queer theory when they argue that “animals make 
us human” (Grandin and Johnson 2009)?
4 Media coverage of this encounter between the Pope and a child who was 
grieving a lost pet presented various views of the Pope’s comments; see Da-
vid Gibson, “Sorry, Fido: Pope Francis Did NOT Say Our Pets Are Going 




After Tyler died, the questions posed by his life and death 
took on added texture when I was invited to reflect theologically 
on a sexual subculture with which I had no personal experience: 
the master/pup relationship. Broadly speaking, this relational 
pattern belongs among the variety of fetishes that populate the 
broader world of leather sexuality.5 In its most basic form, this 
relationship involves a human master and a human pup, the 
latter taking on the bodily comportment, postures, gestures, 
and relational affectations of an actual canine puppy, including 
the accoutrements one might expect to find when living with 
a dog, such as leashes, harnesses, and crates (and sometimes 
leather ears and tails for additional authenticity). This relation-
ship, however, is usually not sexual in the more common genital 
connotations of that word, though the relationship is certainly 
physically affectionate, much like the relationship between a hu-
man and an actual canine. 
Note the qualifier I used twice in the preceding para-
graph — “actual” — which is more problematic than it might first 
appear. An “actual canine” as opposed to what? Do we resort 
to biology and genetics to answer that question? Appearance? 
Behavior? Who decides which of these standard criteria apply 
for definitive classification and who will monitor and regulate 
those distinctions? Questions like these concerning categorical 
classification have most often been asked by queer theorists in 
relation to gender, sexuality, and at times race and ethnicity, but 
only more recently with respect to the supposed and assumed 
understanding of “animal” as that which is other-than-human. 
The limits of language rise up here in formidable pauses, not 
only in relation to God-talk (as nearly ever mystic in almost 
every religious tradition would insist), but also in animal-talk. 
Queer theorists wish to make that very point: categorical clas-
sification schemes usually (if not always) fail to capture reality 
as it is most often encountered and experienced. More severely, 
those schemes are deployed to regulate and restrict what can 
5 For an overview of this kind of sexual expression, including its potential 
insights for theological reflection and spirituality, see Peterson 2012.
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be encountered and which experiences qualify as “authentic” or 
“legitimate.” Consider just the modest scrambling of ordinary 
language usage in the following description of the master/pup 
relationship taken from one of many online communities de-
voted to it: 
A man being a pup wants to let go of inhibitions, to take a 
break from the stress of his human world for a time. Human 
puppies like to simplify their desires and motivations as they 
embrace a new expression of themselves, one that is more 
animal and certainly less socialized-human. As a puppy he 
can wag his tail, and lick his owner’s hand and show his feel-
ings in new and direct ways without fear of judgment.6
That same online community enumerates these qualities of 
a pup: bravery, rational calm, openness, virtue, curiosity, and 
perseverance. To pose the question again: Are these the quali-
ties of the human or the pup? What, exactly, is the difference? 
And what kind of difference would that difference make and for 
whom?
A 2005 documentary film billed as a “pupumentary” on the 
human/canine relationship — more precisely, the human-as-
canine relationship with a human master — offered explicitly 
theological points of contact for the kind of inquiry I am trying 
to pursue in this essay. Master Skip and Pup Tim starred in the 
film, the latter having earned a master of divinity degree (as one 
of my students) and was ordained as a minister in the Universal 
Fellowship of Metropolitan Churches. The film’s promotional 
materials reflect that theological education quite clearly:
PUP follows two gay, Christian leathermen — Master Skip 
and Pup Tim — as they prepare to compete in The Second 
International Puppy Contest (IPC), a leather title contest for 
6 “What is Human Pup Play?” Sirius Pup, http://www.siriuspup.net/what-is-




human canines and their handlers. The documentary is the 
first to introduce puppy play — a fetish in which a human ex-
presses the attributes of a canine, most often in relation to 
another human taking the position of pup handler, owner, 
trainer, etc. Warm, affectionate, and funny, the film reveals 
a rarely seen world. We follow Master Skip and Pup Tim 
through the IPC veterinary exam, where Tim is examined by 
the panel of judges in a private room, and then through the 
public portion of the contest, where the two perform before 
the judges and a large audience […].“The seeking of tran-
scendence is one of the highest human efforts — some do it 
in a church, some in a kennel, and a few in both.” In PUP, we 
meet two men who seek it in both, and for whom fetish is not 
something separate from the spiritual fabric of their lives, but 
rather, is comfortably woven in.7
Borrowing that image of a fabric, I want to offer just three 
threads of what will need to be many more in a project of 
weaving together critical analysis and constructive proposals 
for devoting sustained and deliberate attention to other-than-
human animals in Christian theology. A portion of that fabric, 
as I want to propose in this essay, will portray how we might 
liberate compassion from anthropocentric categorization with 
the hope of inspiring a deep praxis of care toward Earth and its 
many animals, human or otherwise. In shorthand fashion, the 
three “threads” I have in mind are these: (1) rejecting the imago 
Dei as an essentialized category or reified essence in theologi-
cal anthropology; (2) cultivating practices for re-enchanting the 
world; and (3) attending to ecosystems of gay affection.
Theological Anthropology and the Imago Dei
I am persuaded that this first thread determines not only the 
tone and character of Christian approaches to human sexual-
7 The online source for this film has since been removed: http://www.wise-
orchid.com/pupumentary/film.htm (accessed: 1 November 2013).
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ity but also the agenda of Christian theological projects over-
all. What or who is the human in relation to God? This is the 
foundational question of theological anthropology, which queer 
theory renders more complex, not least by interrogating the no-
tion of a “foundation” in any such inquiry (Turner 2000, 1–35). 
The anthropological query has to some degree always informed 
ethical deliberations in Christian history but its contemporary 
significance appeared quite notably in the controversy over 
the election of Gene Robinson — an openly gay and partnered 
Episcopal priest — as Bishop of New Hampshire in 2003. The 
religious critique surrounding that election and its aftermath 
lacked nearly any references to the biblical story of Sodom’s de-
struction in Genesis 19 (a text that theological critics of lesbian 
and gay relationships most commonly cited for decades) and 
focused instead on more robust arguments from Genesis 1 and 
2 concerning the gender “complementarity” of human beings 
(Johnson 2010b). In short, sexual behavior matters only insofar 
as it reflects that which makes human beings human in relation 
to the God who creates us — a key benchmark in theological an-
thropology.
Whether anything of genuine significance separates humans 
from other animals constitutes yet another vital question for 
theological anthropology, which the controversies over human 
sexuality in Christian churches have posed in some particular 
ways. When pursuing, for example, what qualifies as a “natural” 
sexual act, turning to the behavior of other-than-human ani-
mals proves less reliable than one might at first suppose (Alaimo 
2010). What does it mean theologically when humans appear 
more “animalistic” and animals more “cultured” than standard 
systems of classification would seem to permit? Does anything 
of moral or theological significance distinguish humans from 
other animals and, concomitantly, what does this imply con-
cerning how we relate to the many other animals with whom 
we share this planet? The first half of that question has received 
considerable attention in the history of theological ideas (espe-




As responses to questions concerning human distinctiveness 
have been shifting in recent years, and at times rather dramati-
cally, how we conceive of the status of the other-than-human 
animal prompts is, in my view, both a theological and ethical 
crisis. A theological crisis insofar as the inclusion of other-than-
human animals in constructive theological work would compel 
revisiting, rethinking, and reconstructing nearly every Christian 
doctrinal topic (Segerdahl 2011). David Clough makes a con-
vincing argument for this sweeping reconsideration of Chris-
tian doctrine by noting that the logic of Christian theology itself 
turns not on dividing humans from other animals but rather 
on the distinction between Creator and created. Clough be-
lieves that this otherwise subtle shift significantly broadens the 
incarnational claim in the biblical Gospel according to John: the 
word of God became flesh (John 1:14) — not human, but flesh, a 
broader claim about the Creator becoming creature. This affir-
mation of the creaturely God as Creator, Clough argues, “means 
the subversion of all human attempts to create hierarchy among 
creatures” (Clough 2012, 27). 
As Clough strongly implies, these theological reassessments 
then fuel an ethical crisis insofar as human exceptionalism can 
no longer fund religious justifications for treating other-than-
human animals in any way we please as long as such treatment 
eventually accrues to humanity’s benefit. More pointedly, it 
becomes more difficult for human domination to occlude the 
practices of factory farming as a form of torture, which has in 
turn served to blunt and mitigate the suffering of disposable 
humans. Sustained theological attention to other-than-human 
animals, in other words, makes more visible the extent to which 
literary tropes and social practices drawn from the world of 
non-human animals both permits and perpetuates the denigra-
tion, oppression, and abuse of human beings.8 This insight ap-
8 I would much prefer to argue more simply that the pain of other animals in-
flicted on them by human animals suffices as a moment of crisis. But it does 
not, in large measure, because this would risk undermining the justification 
for inflicting pain on other humans. The suffering of human animals and 
other-than-human animals is thus deeply intertwined in complex ways.
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peared at least as early as the 1990s in Carol Adams’ work on 
the connections between sexism and meat production and more 
recently in Michelle Alexander’s analysis of the prison system in 
the United States as a new version of Jim Crow segregation (Ad-
ams 1990; Alexander 2012). Indeed, one could read Alexander’s 
work and consider the mass incarceration of African Americans 
as an analogue of factory farming.
This sense of theological crisis and its ethical quandaries can 
surface a rather wide array of concerns. The relationship be-
tween the imago Dei and “evolutionary theodicy” provides just 
one illustration. Consider first this curiosity: Abrahamic tradi-
tions exhibit little if any consensus on what exactly the image of 
God in humanity entails. Potential candidates populate a rather 
long list. Guunlaugur Jonsson’s survey of those possibilities in 
the religious literature, which he restricted to the period be-
tween 1882 and 1982, ranges from mental endowment and self-
awareness to physical morphology, upright stance, and sexual 
differentiation (Linzey 2009, 28). In the midst of this diversity 
one constant remains: No matter in what the imago Dei consists, 
it nonetheless sets humans apart from all other creatures, and 
usually in a system of hierarchical domination. Empirical evi-
dence for that distinction, however, is dwindling. Biologists and 
ethologists alike now argue (and some have long since simply 
assumed) that many if not most mammals share with humans 
some key components for rational thinking, including problem 
solving and the use of tools, as well as a previously unimagined 
affective life replete with experiences of joy, envy, love, grief, 
companionship, and fear, perhaps even systems of morality.9 
Some theologians still retain the distinctiveness of the imago 
Dei in light of this evidence but modify its import; the distinc-
tion comes not with unique privileges but added responsibility 
(Houston 2012, 149). Or as Clough proposes, human particular-
ity refers to having been “called on by God to image God among 
9 Among the many studies and explorations, see: Csányi 2000; Masson and 
McCarthy 1995; Bekoff and Pierce 2009; and, for the results of the first MRI 
studies of canine brains in conscious dogs: Berns 2013.
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the other creatures” (Clough 2012, 76). The imago Dei in these 
approaches is thus best understood as a vocation of care, a vo-
cational proposal that would at least start to echo approaches by 
queer theorists who emphasize behaviors and practices rather 
than essences and identities in their socio-political analyses of 
the human.10 As Andrew Linzey would likely argue, whether hu-
man beings possess some kind of essence called “the image of 
God” matters far less than whether human beings live in such a 
way as to “become signs of the order of existence for which all 
creatures long” (Linzey 2007, 39).
These ruminations provoke a still deeper theological quan-
dary that runs to the root of the Christian doctrine of crea-
tion. Slowly but surely erasing the line of uniqueness between 
humans and other animals calls the goodness of creation itself 
into question. Simply put, how does one maintain that claim of 
goodness on a planet that apparently runs on the unrelenting 
pain and suffering of every animal (see, e.g., Webb 1998, 115–23, 
174–80)? Christopher Southgate has posed this very question, 
a form of what he calls “evolutionary theodicy” to reflect the 
intensification of this ancient problem in the wake of Darwin’s 
theory of how species evolve. The problem stated succinctly 
from a Darwinian perspective is just this: later forms of life 
emerge only from the pain and suffering of their predecessors. 
As early as 1888, Anglican theologian J.R. Illingworth took se-
riously the theological challenge this Darwinian insight posed: 
“The universality of pain throughout the range of the animal 
world, reaching back into the distant ages of geology, and in-
volved in the very structure of the animal organism, is without 
doubt among the most serious problems which the Theist has to 
face” (Southgate 2008, 1).
Evolutionary biology did not, of course, introduce pain and 
suffering as a theological problem for the modern world. But 
Darwin’s theories did extend the reach of that ancient problem 
10 Nikki Sullivan notes the tendency among queer theorists to resist precise 
definitions (“new labels for old boxes”) and to stress instead a “set of prac-
tices” deployed to resist the regimes of the normal (Sullivan 2003, 43).
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beyond the realm of the human alone and, therefore, weak-
ened the most common strategies theologians had deployed to 
address it. In broad strokes, the traditional approaches to the 
problem of human suffering turned either to a theological gloss 
drawn from the doctrine of original sin (humans merely reap 
what they sow as sinful creatures) or to a related reliance on 
eschatology (heavenly life compensates for earthly loss). But the 
suffering of other-than-human animals exposes added conun-
drums and vexations to any claim for the unqualified goodness 
of creation. Apart from robust notions of sin or some form of 
eschatological compensation, how can systems of Christian the-
ology address other-than-human pain and still sustain an affir-
mation of divine goodness with any confidence? 
This question has proved vexing to theologians only within 
the last few decades, and even then without the kind of wide-
spread urgency it deserves. Just posing such questions inter-
rupts a long-standing supposition that other-than-human an-
imals do not experience pain, do not suffer, do not worry or 
fall into anxiety, or more generally bear no stamp whatsoever 
of the imago Dei. This supposition has shaped a considerable 
array of cultural patterns and funded foundational modes of hu-
man self-understanding that many find difficult if not impossi-
ble to relinquish. Experimentation on live animals, for example, 
whether for purposes ranging from testing cosmetics to military 
physicians practicing surgical skills, is still broadly legal in most 
countries. Some restrictions on the most egregious of these 
practices — such as surgical procedures without any anesthe-
sia — have appeared in Europe and the US, but only relatively re-
cently. Justifying these practices, which are usually grouped un-
der the broad banner of “vivisection,” seems difficult to imagine 
unless one supposes that such acts cause no pain, either physical 
or emotional, or that the pain is negligible for “mere” animals 
when it is inflicted for the greater good of humans (who, in this 
form of the supposition, are decidedly not “animals”).11 
11 Matthew Scully notes that the appeal to “science” and “scientific research” 
tends to cover a plethora of abusive and torturous practices with a veneer of 
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In short, as it becomes increasingly difficult if not impossible 
to deny or overlook or dismiss the pain and suffering of other-
than-human animals, particularly intractable if not intolerable 
philosophical and ethical problems start coming more vividly 
to light, many of which have been part and parcel of Christian 
theological constructions from the beginning.12 Solutions to 
these problems will emerge, not from doctrinal reconstructions 
alone (vital as they are), but from adopting a posture toward the 
world of God’s creation marked by a spiritual practice of “re-
enchantment.” 
A Re-Enchanted World
The way I am referring to this second thread comes from the 
work of sociologist James William Gibson and the broader 
ecological frame he constructs for engaging with other-than-
human animals (Gibson 2009). In his helpful chronicling of the 
progress Western society has made over the last fifty years in 
addressing ecological crises, he notes the importance of politi-
cal advocacy, legislative initiatives, and regulatory control. Each 
of these made a contribution in its own way, yet none of them, 
either alone or in combination, will advance effective responses 
to the environmental challenge we currently face on a planet-
wide scale.
Gibson proposes enchantment, or rather re-enchantment 
with the world of nature as the missing piece in this ecological 
puzzle and which, he argues, holds the key to save us from envi-
ronmental disaster. Gibson cites Max Weber to make his point 
and to provide the lynchpin image. Weber worried that Protes-
tant Christianity had installed within modern Western culture 
the notion of God as entirely detached from the wider world 
professional respect or for the sake of advancing the “greater good” of the 
human species (Scully 2002, 380).
12 Andrew Linzey agrees and offers a summary of the most frequently cited 
reasons for why humans have chosen either to ignore animal suffering or 
deny that animals suffer at all or to suppose that such suffering poses no 
particular moral, let alone theological problem (Linzey 2009, 40–42).
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of nature and concerned only with humans; “nature,” in other 
words, serves only as a stage on which the divine-human drama 
plays out. Weber then notes, in a flash of prescience, how this 
static portrayal of God’s creation would eventually render the 
natural world merely a warehouse of resources for sustaining 
capitalist development. Rather strikingly, Weber credited this 
dangerous trajectory to the “intellectualization” of Western cul-
ture and especially its “disenchantment of the world” (Gibson 
2009, 16).
In short, planetary life now depends on whether human 
beings will understand environmentalism as deeply spiritual 
work, including an arduous assessment of Western society’s per-
ceived detachment from the non-human world of crude cause-
and-effect mechanisms. Margaret Barker’s work is just one of 
the more recent additions to a growing theological and spiritual 
chorus in which she draws from an Eastern Orthodox perspec-
tive to make a proposal similar to Gibson’s. Noting the array 
of competing priorities, both cultural and economic, that keep 
politicians focused only on short-term solutions, Barker urges 
a return to the biblical vision of humanity’s deep rootedness in 
creation to inspire a more effective Christian response to pre-
sent ecological dilemmas (Barker 2012, 4).
I would build on the work offered by both Gibson and Barker 
to suggest that this “quest for a new kinship with nature,” that 
sense of “enchantment” firmly rooted in the world as God’s own 
creation, entails sustained attention to the development of at 
least three component parts for such a quest: empathy, intimacy, 
and compassion. This would mean, in broad strokes, that the 
slow dissolution of the imago Dei as humanity’s exclusive pos-
session contributes to an awareness of other-than-human pain 
and suffering, or empathy. Even this modest bridge between hu-
mans and other animals invites in turn relationships marked by 
a profound intimacy with creatures and ecosystems rather than 
only by systems of bureaucratic management and control. Inti-
mate relations can then prompt and sustain a posture of compas-
sion and its commitment to a praxis of care.
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Animating that relational arc does, however, entail a signifi-
cant shift in humanity’s self-perception and a reorientation of 
humanity’s position and posture in the created order. A similar 
shift in sexual self-perception — and not without similar expres-
sions of anxiety — was prompted by lesbian and gay relation-
ships and the queer lens they provide for (re)reading the biblical 
account of divine creation. The modern emphasis on “gender 
complementarity” in Genesis 2, for example, overlooks what 
many ancient commentators would have us consider about that 
text.
After repeatedly affirming the goodness of what God creates, 
the biblical storyteller has God notice the one thing that is not 
good — the human creature God just made seems so mourn-
fully alone. The first attempt at a divine solution to this problem 
appears both startling and endearing: God presents a host of 
animals to the human to see if any of them might make a suit-
able companion (Genesis 2:18–20), and presumably that first 
human could have chosen any one of those animals (Greenberg 
2004, 50–51). Rather than choosing just one of these creatures, 
however, the human gives a name to each one — not a category 
or classification, but a name. While some queer theorists treat 
names and even the act of naming with suspicion, as types of 
categorical classification (Sullivan 2003, 46), they need not of 
necessity function as regulatory markers. Naming a creature 
can be a profoundly intimate act of relational tenderness, as any 
parent of a newborn child knows, as well as anyone who names 
a nonhuman animal companion. This seems to be the biblical 
writer’s very point in a story about a solitary human finding in-
timacy in an enchanting world of other animals (Johnson 2013, 
145–49).
Ecosystems of Gay Affection
The third and final thread of this essay returns (eventually) 
to Master Skip and Pup Tim, who might inspire ways to be-
gin weaving a liberating practice from these insights of queer 
theorists and queerly related theologians. I return to the pup 
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phenomenon for help in surfacing what so often remains unno-
ticed in the first two threads, what I would call the energy of the 
desire for communion, a broad desire to which gay and lesbian 
people do not bear exclusive witness, to be sure, but who might 
nonetheless contribute catalytic insights.
I remain convinced of queer theory’s usefulness for discern-
ing various ways in which lesbian and gay relationships can 
contribute to constructive theological work, especially concern-
ing theological anthropology. Queer theorizing offers this as-
sistance with the critical gaze it turns on the categorical clas-
sification schemes of the modern West, the schemes that frame 
answers to anthropological investigations with binary construc-
tions — male or female, black or white, straight or gay — which 
are then bolstered and maintained with a variety of regulatory 
regimes, whether political or religious. As that critical gaze like-
wise illumines who benefits from those classification schemes 
and how they do, this queerly deconstructive gesture now needs 
to reach toward that ubiquitous distinction between “human” 
and “animal” (Giffney and Hird 2008). Just as the critical analy-
sis of the binary gender system among queer theorists carries 
broader transformational implications in areas ranging from 
race and ethnicity to economics and class, so also the queering 
of humanity’s privileged position holds potential for mobilizing 
theological resources in broader and more effective efforts to 
address the ongoing degradation of planetary ecosystems. Or 
as David Abram has urged, though without explicitly resorting 
to queer theory per se, we need to restore a sense of the human 
as deeply embedded in Earth, not above it or even on it but en-
sconced within its rhythms and patterns: 
The human body is not a closed or static object, but an open, 
unfinished entity utterly entwined with the soils, waters, and 
winds that move through it — a wild creature whose life is 
contingent upon the multiple other lives that surround it, 




Extrapolating from this kind of queer analysis, the component 
parts I proposed for a re-enchanted world — empathy, intimacy, 
and compassion — likewise languish in categorical systems that 
classify nearly every relationship as either “sexual” or “platonic” 
(to use that old-fashioned euphemism), and that further divide 
the former into legitimately “heterosexual” and illicitly “homo-
sexual.” Patrick Cheng has described this dynamic by turning 
to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and its resistance to 
the binary division between the interior “self ” and the exter-
nal “other,” which he then maps to the contemporary reduction 
of all relationships as either sexual or not (Cheng 2011, 56). He 
recalls Elizabeth Stuart’s similarly Trinitarian analysis of the 
role played by friendship in Christian traditions and both its 
cultural and religious reduction to pair-bonded monogamy. To 
those projects, I would add the historical and sociological work 
on marriage done by Stephanie Coontz, who argues that the el-
evation of romantic love as the primary reason for and content 
of the institution of marriage marks a startling innovation of 
the modern West, which has actually destabilized the institution 
itself (Coontz 2005). Among the consequences of this cultural 
shift, she notes, has been the slow but steady erosion of deep 
friendships outside of the marital relationship. Elizabeth Stuart 
explains why this might matter theologically:
The formation of friendships is part of the larger project of 
learning to embrace the stranger, but friendship also serves 
to break the bonds of culturally constructed kinship and the 
captivity of passion within sexual relationships. Friendship 
keeps the eschatological dream alive by breaking love out of 
coupledom, by breaking love out of the confines of sexual 
orientation, and sometimes by outlasting other forms of love 
(Stuart 2003, 113).
Stuart clearly has human relationships in mind when she urges 
us to “embrace the stranger” and break the “bonds of culturally 
constructed kinship,” but these exhortations surely belong on 
the wider landscape of inter-species relations as well. What those 
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relations entail deserves and sometimes demands a caveat: I do 
not mean “bestiality,” as many anti-LGBT commentators might 
quickly suppose. The need to make such a caveat explicit speaks 
volumes about the peculiar dilemmas that emerge in the process 
of re-enchanting the world of other-than-human animals. Crit-
ics of “same-sex” relationships do not place bestiality on that 
ethical slippery slope toward ruin just randomly or merely for 
shock value, nor is this alarming caution new to Western dis-
course. The same anxiety and near panic percolated in the urge, 
on the one hand, to clarify the economic distinctions of class 
in nineteenth century Europe by classifying the sexual relations 
of the lower classes as more closely “bestial” (Lacqueur 1990, 
205), and on the other hand, the portrayal of sexual relations in 
African tribes as similarly “bestial” to bolster the justification 
for their enslavement (Douglas 2005, 114). More recently, both 
Ben Carson (a retired pediatric neurosurgeon and former can-
didate for President of the United States) and televangelist Pat 
Robertson illustrated the political and religious utility of other-
than-human animals to induce disgust. More specifically, by 
evoking (unspecified) relationships with (unnamed) “animals” 
they sought to arouse the kind of revulsion toward “same-sex” 
relationships sufficient to mobilize both political and religious 
groups to oppose marriage equality.13
Here then I return to Master Skip and Pup Tim, who enact 
what the modern West has had so much difficulty imagining as 
even possible for most men but especially gay-identified men: 
physical affection apart from genital sexual relations. Skip and 
Tim do this, of course, by performing the other-than-human. 
13 Carson and Robertson evoked bestiality explicitly as the likely result of 
permitting same-sex marriage. Concerning Robertson, see Trudy Ring, 
“WATCH: Marriage Equality Will Lead to Man-Animal Love Affairs, Says 
Pat Robertson,” Advocate, July 22, 2015, http://www.advocate.com/mar-
riage-equality/2015/07/22/watch-marriage-equality-will-lead-man-animal-
love-affairs-says-pat-robe, and concerning Carson, see “G.O.P. Hopes for 





Do we lament or recoil from this blurring of categories? Or can 
this rupture of standard classification belong to what might be 
called an ecosystem of gay affection, and perhaps yield a source 
of theological insight? David Nimmons mapped some of those 
forms of affection among gay men in twentieth-century San 
Francisco, forms that do not always rely on monogamous pair-
bonding, or what he refers to as an expansion of permissible 
intimacies (Nimmons 2002, 7–8). Alan Bray chronicled a much 
longer and even more compelling history in England, a nearly 
one-thousand year history of blurring the lines between friend-
ship and marriage (Bray 2003). Pup play in leather communi-
ties constitutes yet another iteration of queer affection. Again, 
recalling one practitioner’s description: A puppy can “wag his 
tail, and lick his owner’s hand and show his feelings in new and 
direct ways without fear of judgment.”14
Cultivating inter-species relationships of empathy and inti-
macy just might liberate our human capacity for compassion, 
unleashing it from the categorical classification schemes that 
have held such compassion captive to ideologies infused with 
both violence and torture. Liberating compassion from its cate-
gorical prisons could contribute not only to the decrease in ani-
mal suffering on this planet but indeed to the saving of Earth’s 
ecosystem vitality. Making that global leap will seem far less 
daunting when humans recognize how deeply embedded we 
have always been in a complex world of (re)enchanted animals.
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Queer Values for a Queer 
Climate: Developing a Versatile 
Planetary Ethic
Whitney A. Bauman
Due to globalization and climate change, we are becoming more 
and more aware of the “queerness” of our planet. The Modern 
categories by which we fix our realities, simply no longer hold. 
The Modern ethics and technologies of control have given way 
to uncertainty and ambiguity about our planetary future. Once 
seemingly hermetically sealed categories and boundaries be-
tween self/other, human/animal, nature/culture, organic/ma-
chine and science/religion, have now been uncovered as leaky 
and porous. How do we respond ethically in this situation to the 
real and present dangers posed by breaching the limits of our 
planetary systems without merely forcing our own “longed for 
futures” and our own values and dreams onto the entire planet? 
This article argues that we need to open up to and entertain 
some different values for addressing the twin, wicked problems 
of globalization and climate change. 
Arguing along the lines of Judith Halberstam, In a Queer 
Time and Place, we need an ethics of ambiguity and unknow-
ing rather than progress (Halberstam 2005). Such an ethic does 
not transform all reality into the human narrative of progress 
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(whether technological or environmental or both), but rather 
acknowledges the multiplicity of planetary times and values 
that refuse to be captured by any singular story. We need what 
Timothy Morton understands as a “queer ecology” or an “ecol-
ogy without nature” (Morton 2010). Finally queering our sense 
of linear time and our sense of ecology may in turn lead to a 
queering of our hopes, dreams, and desires that help us to break 
out of what Rob Nixon calls “fossil-fueled dreams” (Nixon 2011). 
In the end, environmental ethics cannot be modeled on efficient 
causality and instrumental reason alone: this is the very mana-
gerial attitude toward all of life that has created our problems 
in the first place. Rather, environmental ethics would do well to 
engage with some models that respect the radically queer, as-
sembled and evolving nature of our planetary community 
Globalization and Climate Change: Assembling Us All 
Willis Jenkins in his recent book argues, in relationship to cli-
mate change, that “our brains are not adapted to problems with 
such abstract causation, inherent uncertainty, and extensive 
scales of time and space. Neither are our concepts” (Jenkins 
2013, 42). His book is an attempt to examine “wicked” problems, 
which arise from the twin phenomena of globalization and 
climate change. This article adds more tools to that analytical 
kit that might be used for thinking about how to address the 
problems arising from these two phenomena. Therefore, I begin 
here with operational definitions of these interrelated processes, 
which, more than anything, mark our identities as members of 
a planetary community today. 
Globalization has multiple contexts and meanings both good 
and bad (Lorentzen 2011). Here, I use it to refer to the process of 
the “space-time crunch” that results from the increased speed in 
transportation, communication, and production. This increase 
in speed is of course tied to the use, by some, of ancient car-
bon at the expense of many earth others. As such, it is impor-
tant to see what is abjected in the production of this space-time 
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crunch.1 In other words, what gets left out of “progress” or be-
comes “under-developed” for many human and earth-others in 
the process of globalization? What allows for this degradation 
(e.g., Ruether 2004; Shiva 1989)? Though space does not per-
mit me to explore here all of the factors that contribute to the 
“space-time” crunch, three crucial factors I want to explore are 
the narrowing of causality to efficient causality, the narrowing of 
reason to instrumental reason, and the narrowing of family to 
the nuclear family. 
Aristotle, as is well known, argued that there were four dif-
ferent types of causality: material, efficient, formal, and final 
(Aristotle 1996, II.3). The material is what it sounds like: what 
the thing is made of. The efficient cause is an external cause 
that brings about change in motion or form. The formal cause 
is roughly equivalent to structural forces and shapes that cause 
change. And, the final cause or telos is the ultimate purpose 
toward which something moves or changes. It seems that for 
Aristotle, among many others, causes were not limited to imme-
diacy. This means that agency, or some form of vitality could be 
found in each of these causal nexuses: the material itself, some 
external force, the structure of things, and the ultimate end or 
purpose toward which something exists/moves. The point here 
is that, just as contemporary emergent theorists and new mate-
rialisms claim, agency is distributed throughout all of life and 
not located in one place or type of thing (Deacon 2013; Barad 
2007).
A distributed understanding of causality and agency is not, 
however, effective for what later becomes modern Western sci-
ence. As Carolyn Merchant argued, the rise of modern, West-
ern Science can in many ways be captured by the metaphor “the 
death of nature” (Merchant 1980). Over the course of a few cen-
turies, nature is turned from something that is in many ways 
1 Abjection is a term used in theory, especially queer theory, to refer to that 
which is left out of or left over in identity formation or in the defining of a 




alive, to dead stuff that is to be used toward human ends. Mer-
chant and many others such as Londa Schiebinger have noted 
that this narrowing of causality to efficient causality also had 
the effect of making objects out of living things within nature: 
including plants, other animals, and some people, particular-
ly women and colonized peoples (Schiebinger 1993). In other 
words, as causality was narrowed to those forces that immedi-
ately shape a current situation, so agency was reinforced as pow-
er over or control of something. We can think of this narrowing 
as the historical precursor to the consumer society’s desire for 
immediacy. In a patriarchal society where different races, sexes, 
and classes of peoples are empowered according to a hierarchy 
of privilege, it becomes all too easy to mistake one’s place of 
privilege within that hierarchy for one’s ability to have causal 
effect. This is done through a series of “backgrounding” other’s 
agency and focusing in on one’s own actions in a given situation 
(Plumwood 2002). The focus on efficient causality, then, enables 
a reading of social relations back in to the natural world through 
naturalizing and internalizing social relations which have been 
constructed over time, what Foucault identifies as biopower and 
biopolitics (Foucault 1976).2 The focus on efficient causality (fo-
cused on the result of something caused in the immediate past) 
was also accompanied by a narrowing of reason to instrumental 
reason (focus on what might be done in the immediate future).
Just as causality was a much broader category among the 
Ancient Greeks, so rationality and reason had many different 
types. Max Weber identifies at least four types of rationality, 
including: instrumental, value-based, affectual, and conven-
tional (Karlberg 1980). Among the Greeks there were distinc-
tions between practical, theoretical and instrumental forms of 
2 This type of “naturalization” or “god-trick” is also the concern of Donna 
Haraway and eventually leads her to develop the concept of “nature-cul-
tures” in order to prevent such naturalization. (Haraway 1991, 189–96). 
Bruno Latour is also concerned about this process of “freeze-framing” and 
it leads him to do away with nature and culture altogether and posit in its 
place “the collective” in an attempt to bring nature back into the political 
realm (Latour 2004). 
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rationality. Practical asks the more complicated ethical ques-
tions about what one ought to do, theoretical allows for a more 
abstract working through of various ideas, while instrumental 
is applied in order to bring about a desired effect. Again, dur-
ing the modern Western scientific revolution, the reduction of 
agency to immediacy was mirrored by a reduction of reason 
to the instrumental variety. The question became, what can we 
get out of the world or what can the rest of nature do for “us” 
(however defined), rather than what our place is in the world 
in relationship to other entities. Again, this type of rationality, 
what we might call a rationality of immediacy or a self-serving 
rationality, is enabled by a reading of one’s privileged position in 
a social hierarchy back into the rest of the natural world. Instru-
mental rationality, in other words, is much easier to execute the 
higher you are on the political and economic spectrum. From a 
privileged perspective — perhaps, noble, clerical, wealthy, and/
or male — one can easily background the relationality that is 
constitutive of a given situation, and ask how that situation can 
benefit the individual. Furthermore, the more social, political, 
and economic capital one has, the more he/she is able to act 
“as if ” he/she is an isolated individual and bring his/her desired 
outcome into reality. 
Lest I be charged with making a simplistic argument, I am 
not arguing that the narrowing of reason to instrumental rea-
son and the narrowing of causality to efficient causality was a 
total or intentional move. It is not a new argument that mod-
ern Western science and the process of colonization go hand 
in hand (Pratt 1992). As the European colonizers spread across 
the globe their aim was to bring resources back to the center 
of the empire. This economic aim benefited from the narrow-
ing of causes to efficient causes, and the narrowing of reason to 
instrumental reason. It is what enabled the claim of terra nullius 
and thus what enabled the projection of the needs and desires 
of the colonizers onto lands and resources that were indeed in-
habited by many human and earth others. Many positionalities 
throughout the colonial hierarchy were excluded from this way 
of producing knowledge and its spoils. These very position-
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alities — the abject — came back to haunt the narrowing of the 
world to the confines of modern, western science, a point to 
which I will return. First, however, I want to outline one final 
ordering of the world that needed to be in place for the “pro-
ductionist” model of modern Western science, economics, and 
politics to be transformed into first the industrial revolution and 
later globalizing neo-liberal capitalism (Thompson 1995). 
As is well known, thanks in large part to the work of queer 
theorists, the production of the nuclear family is to a large ex-
tent a product of the Victorian Era (Foucault 1976). Of course 
such a nuclear family is dependent upon the construction of 
heteronormativity, patriarchal gender roles, and childhood, all 
of which were in place by the Victorian era. How does such a 
narrowing of the family relate to the narrowing of causality and 
reason in the productionist model of Modern science? First, the 
narrowing of family to the nuclear helps to transform “the com-
mons” into private property (owned by individual families) and 
social welfare concerns into “private” family concerns (Halber-
stam 2011, 72). What was once a communal or state responsibil-
ity becomes more and more the responsibility of the individual 
family unit (with its so-called “head” of the household assuming 
control over the supposed “body” of the household). Second, 
these individual units become more manageable, taxable, and 
accountable to the productionist model of science (medical, po-
litical, economic, and otherwise): without social welfare, each 
family is responsible for its own housing, daily bread, education, 
etc. Such a narrowing of “family” helps to shift concern from 
the polis and public good (a very messy and inefficient entity) 
toward the immediate concern of what is good for “me and my 
immediate family”. Of course, the abject in this model are the 
insane, elderly, widowed, orphaned, unmarried, enslaved, disa-
bled, and poor who often face in various ways more difficulties 
than others in modern Western societies. This model of family 
has an efficient way of dealing with the responsibility of raising 
the next generation, inheritance, and units of consumption, one 
that models the narrowing of causality to efficient and reason-
ing to instrumental. One is also reminded here of the efficiency 
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of Freudian psychology, which tends to narrow all of one’s psy-
chology to the parental figures. Or the ways in which parents 
(often women) are blamed for the bad behaviors of their chil-
dren. In any event, this reduction of family has social, economic, 
political, and legal implications.
With the reduction of causality (agency) to efficient causal-
ity (looking to the past), the reduction of reason (thought) to 
instrumental reason (thinking about the future), and the reduc-
tion of the family (social) to the nuclear family (the unit of the 
present) the world is transformed so as to confirm these reduc-
tions. In other words, these three pillars of the truth regime of 
industrial (and later global) capitalism transform the world ac-
cording to their specifications: turn the dials to these three set-
tings and you get the type of global capitalism we have today. 
This becomes the context for the transformation of the planet 
that we think of now as “global climate change.” Ironically it is 
this very reaction to the human forces of globalization on the 
part of the planetary community that is now beginning to open 
us up to a much “queerer” understanding of the planetary com-
munity than we had before. 
Listening to the Ecological Abject: Lessons from the End of 
Nature
Bill McKibben’s infamous book and statement that global cli-
mate change and human actions have ended “nature” as a cat-
egory of life that is somehow separate from human influence is 
now widely affirmed by the idea that we are entering the geo-
logical era of the Anthropocene (McKibben 1989).3 Even the 
most adamant advocates of wilderness would likely not disagree 
that human forces of climate change have now placed the planet 
on an uncertain journey and that this changes every place and 
everything on the planet. I do not want to simply rehash these 
3 I have critiqued this language of the “anthropocene” for leveling humanity 
as if all humans are equally responsible, and for denying agency to the rest 
of the natural world (Bauman 2015). 
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arguments here, but would, rather, argue that from the perspec-
tive of performative identities, these planetary changes have a 
silver lining. Rather than narrating the end of nature, climate 
change and globalization are helping us to understand that na-
ture is agential and always in process; rather than just being in 
the period of the sixth great extinction, we are beginning to un-
derstand more deeply our interrelatedness and co-constructed-
ness with the rest of the natural world; and rather than merely 
responding with scenarios for how to manage climate change, 
we have an opportunity to do some deep interspecies listening 
and unknowing and focus on the indeterminacy of the plan-
etary future. 
In the old debate among feminists (and others) about wheth-
er identity is “essential” or “constructed,” Judith Butler’s notion 
of performativity offers a third way. In her book Bodies That 
Matter, she means the word “matter” in a two-fold sense: bodies 
matter in terms of how one becomes in the world, and they are 
also mattered by ideas and other bodies in the world. In other 
words identities, bodies, entities, are constituted and formed 
through their relations rather than a priori or a posteriori. She 
writes, “The power of the terms ‘women’ or ‘democracy’ is not 
derived from their ability to describe adequately or comprehen-
sively a political reality that already exists; on the contrary, the 
political signifier becomes politically efficacious by instituting 
and sustaining a set of connections as political reality” (But-
ler 1993, 210). This process of co-construction is made clearer 
through her understanding of performativity. 
Performativity does not mean that we just perform an iden-
tity that we choose. Rather, it means that we are born into hab-
its of becoming in certain ways, depending upon the time and 
place in which we are born in to. Depending upon our posi-
tionality within these worlds according to our embodiments, 
there are certain habits or norms for performing “successfully” 
as male, female, straight, gay, white, human, American, success-
ful, etc. However, there is no single embodiment of the ideal 
of any of these norms, and no one performs any identity per-
fectly. This is why Butler claims that we are all always “in drag” 
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to greater or lesser degrees (Butler 1990). It is in the remainder, 
the abject, in what is left out of our mattering bodies’ attempts 
to live into these ideals, that possibilities for changing the norms 
and our performances of these norms emerge. Karen Barad, in 
her book Meeting the Universe Halfway, extends this notion of 
performativity beyond its implications for humans to the rest 
of the natural world (2007). She suggests that if we take Niels 
Bohr’s understanding of quantum indeterminacy seriously, 
then at least at the quantum level of reality the universe is not 
pre-determined but there is some amount of “indecision” as to 
which way the universe becomes. As a metaphor, this performa-
tive nature of life might be extended to all other levels of life: to 
the cellular, the organism, the ecosystem, the planet, the galaxy 
and even the universe. If this is the case, then we really do live 
in a universe that is pregnant with multiple, and even not-yet-
known, possibilities. 
In such a universe (or rather multiverse?) the future of this 
planet is not bound to our preconceived notions of it or any 
other future conceptions of it; rather, it truly is an open, evolv-
ing, planetary community. Heidegger’s understanding of the 
violence that takes place when we make the world “standing re-
serve” toward human ends again becomes relevant here (1977). 
We ought not force the world to fit into our own conceptions 
because this inherently reduces the world to human efficient 
causality and instrumental reason. Such reductionism allows for 
the speed of fossil fueled realities, but creates much violence in 
its wake. In this sense, we need models such as found in emer-
gence theory, in Deleuzian assemblages, in hybrid and queer 
combinations, and even hyper-objects to help think us out of 
our tendencies toward making the entire world relevant only 
as it is relevant toward human ends (e.g., Deleuze and Guattari 
1987; Morton 2013). These and other queer sensibilities might 
help us to break out of the thought-habits of modern scientific 
reduction, and help open us on to our always and already intrac-
tability from evolving earth-others. Rather than describe some 
of these models for ontology, metaphysics, and identity, I spend 
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the rest of this article working out some components of what 
queering the planet might imply. 
Queer Possibilities for a Queer Planet
Queer subcultures produce alternative temporalities by al-
lowing their participants to believe that their futures can be 
imagined according to logics that lie outside of those para-
digmatic markers of life experience — namely, birth, mar-
riage, reproduction, and death. (Halberstam 2005, 2) 
As Judith/Jack Halberstam notes in the epigram to this section, 
queering time and place might help us to break out of the habits 
of becoming according to the laws of capitalist reproduction. 
Such reproduction, such performances, I would argue, rely 
heavily on the reduction of reason to instrumental reason, cau-
sality to efficient causality, and family to the nuclear, as laid out 
in the previous section of this article. If, then, we are to trouble 
these three modes of reproduction, which lead to violence to-
ward many earth-bodies, then we have to develop mechanisms 
for thinking about our relationality in different ways. By way of 
thinking differently about instrumental reason and its role in 
the time of progress, here I articulate a queer notion of time that 
doesn’t depend upon progressive narratives. In order to chal-
lenge the reduction of causality to efficient causality, here I of-
fer a queer ecology in which agency and causality is distributed 
among and between multiple planetary actants. And, finally, 
in order to think outside of our nuclear notions of family and 
reproduction, I end this article with queering our hopes and 
dreams for the future of planetary becomings. In the end, these 
queer attempts will hopefully make us much more versatile and 
adaptable in the context of a planet that is on the move. 
The Queer Time of Reverberation
It’s very difficult to keep the line between the present and the past. 
— Little Edie, “Grey Gardens”
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One of the hallmarks of colonization and capitalist modes of 
production is linear time. As Walter Mignolo notes, the light 
of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment projects a darkness 
over the Golden Age of Islam and other indigenous traditions 
with which the European colonizer comes into contact (1995). 
This model of time has implications for one’s relationship to his-
tory and culture. For starters, linear time inevitably makes one 
focused on the future as possibility at the expense of the past. 
The past is “left behind” as somehow backwards while the future 
contains the light of progress and reason. For many colonized 
peoples this means turning away from the authority of religious 
traditions and ancestors. It can also mean turning toward the 
Western promise of development, enlightenment, industrializa-
tion, and progress. As Mary Louise Pratt points out in Imperial 
Eyes, the interaction of colonizers with “wilderness” and “terra 
nullius” provides the fodder with which the continuation of pro-
gress takes place (1992). Once the Western front is closed, the 
process of economic and technological globalization continues 
in the form of expanding markets in the “developing world” and 
in East and Southeast Asia. To a lesser extent, this linear time is 
also continued through the final frontier of space and cosmol-
ogy. It is no small coincidence that a cosmology with a Big Bang 
beginning moves from some singular, original point outwards in 
space and time, as if in a singular narrative of development. This 
“scientific” cosmology is, as Mary Jane Rubenstein has pointed 
out, very much located in a specific theological and cultural way 
of understanding scientific data. It mimics the logic of a God 
that creates all (singular) reality, ex nihilo (Rubenstein 2014). 
Queer time helps to disrupt this singular narrative, whether 
we are talking about the queer time of non-locality in quantum 
physics, the multiverse of cosmology, or the developmental time 
of individual humans. Nonlocality suggests that there is some 
connection between entities outside of our experience of regu-
lar, linear time; this goes against the grain of relating entities 
through efficient causality and instrumental reason. The relativ-
ity of time proposed by Einstein’s famous equation also means 
that time is relatively experienced depending upon gravitational 
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forces. This is truly an affront to any linear narrative or single 
experience of time, which is enforced universally. Not all enti-
ties play by the same rules or according to the same understand-
ing of time. Likewise, the notion of the multiverse — whether 
through infinite oscillations or through the proliferation of all 
possibilities — trips up any understanding of time that might 
seek to be all-encompassing (Rubenstein 2014). From the quan-
tum to the cosmological level, there really is no singular tunnel 
of time into which all things fit on the way to some ideal space of 
progress; rather time is local, contextual, it reverberates within 
specific contexts relative to the space-shape-contours of those 
contexts. 
This reverberating time, or what Michelle Wright refers to as 
“epiphenomenal time” (2015), is also something that queer iden-
tities experience in relationship to the heteronormative under-
standing of identity development. There is no compelling linear 
movement from childhood to family to career to retirement; 
these tropes don’t make as much sense for non-reproductive 
types of relationships. This is not to say that some queer indi-
viduals do not decide to follow in the footsteps of the habits of 
heteronormative development, nor that there is anything neces-
sarily wrong with specific heterosexual lifestyles. Rather, it does 
mean that family can be understood as something beyond the 
development of the nuclear family; that childhood can be non-
existent as it has been in many cultures for much of history, or 
can be extended well into what would be considered adulthood; 
and that the markers of what a successful career might be fall 
well outside of any system based upon the notion of “providing 
for one’s nuclear family.” Queer time might be at one moment 
living with an elderly parent, at another caring for nephews and 
nieces, at another becoming a harbor for stray queers at vari-
ous stages in life, and at another living in a gay environmental 
commune. Queer families, as Halberstam argues, are also much 
more contextual and don’t necessarily last “until death do us 
part”: they are for a time (2011). Finally, queer families and queer 
time are not beholden to the laws of inheritance in the same 
ways that nuclear family and linear time are. Though there is a 
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“pink capitalism” (and I am not suggesting that LGBTQ identities 
have not been subsumed under capitalism in many cases), there 
is much more room within a non-nuclear understanding of 
family, and thus for an understanding of time and development 
that is non-linear, to “leave your mother and father” in order to 
create a new family and community beyond the boundaries of 
blood (and even species) kinship. 
With these queerings of time, perhaps we can begin to really 
couch our own lives in terms of the journeys of other lives, the 
planet, and the universe. As in Confucianism, for instance, the 
understanding of an individual’s life is embedded in concentric 
expanding circles of concern, so here might we begin to think 
of our selves in such a context rather than in a linear journey 
moving from birth to death (Tucker and Berthrong 1998). Such 
a reverberating time, then, might help us to cultivate an ecology 
of relationships that stretches across multiple generations and 
multiple terrains (e.g., Jenkins 2013, 282ff).
Queer Ecology for a Queer Planet
Queer ecology requires a vocabulary envisioning this liquid 
life. I propose that life-forms constitute a mesh, a nontotal-
izable, open-ended concatenation of interrelations that blur 
and confound boundaries at practically any level: between 
species, between the living and the nonliving, between or-
ganism and environment. (Morton 2010, 275) 
If time is reverberating and non-teleological, then space and the 
bodies that constitute space might better be thought of as liquid. 
We can get to this queer reading of ecology from many differ-
ent perspectives, including from ecology itself (Sandilands and 
Erickson 2010). In a sense, the ecotonal edges of all ecosystems, 
which exchange energy and information between ecosystems 
and allow the ecosystems to evolve and continue living, operate 
metaphorically in the same way as a Deleuzian assemblage or as 
Butler’s performative identity. Each “collecting” of a given eco-
system is an assemblage of various historical bio-cultural flows 
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of energy and information. At the same time, each collecting (or 
subjection in Butler’s terms) creates abjects that are remainders 
or leftovers, which become part of a different collecting, ad in-
finitum (cf. Latour 2004). In this brief section, I want to make 
palatable this verbose paragraph with some more bite-sized ex-
amples on which the reader might masticate. 
First, we can think of queer ecology through the queerness 
of evolution. As authors such as Joan Roughgarden have point-
ed out, nature does not promote any type of sexuality. Rather, 
heteronormativity is read into nature. In her book, Evolution’s 
Rainbow, she catalogues many species that are homosexual, 
transgendered, hermaphroditic, and asexual. Furthermore, she 
goes on to argue, as other feminist philosophers of science have, 
that cooperation is just as important in the process of evolution 
as (if not more than) competition (Roughgarden 2004). What 
she and others are basically arguing is that heternormativity has 
been read into the evolutionary record, just as racism and sex-
ism has, by mostly elite men “doing” science. We can see this as 
well in the work of Linnaeus when he describes the plant world 
in terms of the heterosexual family (Schiebinger 1993). Once 
we begin to see the diversity of sexualities in nature, and also 
that ecosystems and individual organisms depend upon a very 
highly developed amount of cooperation and symbiosis, then 
we can begin to challenge the idea that evolution is some type 
of narrative of progress toward the survival of the fittest or most 
evolved. Instead, we can look at the various terrains of evolution 
and how these terrains fit together. In fact, it may be better in the 
end to think of nature as a Deleuzian rhizome, which spreads 
out in many directions, has various offshoots, but has no real 
beginning or end; it just grows. Our breaking up the world into 
specific things and into a linear narrative of competition, then, 
is just one way of organizing the world. I would argue that this 
way of organizing does little for helping us to recognize our ani-
mality and embeddedness with other evolving creatures. 
My second point is that we can queer ecology through re-
flecting on our own animality (Chen 2012). We are deeply in-
tertwined with the bio-historical evolutionary flows of other 
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species and organisms: plant, animal, and mineral. In fact our 
human forms are better thought of as assemblages of multiple 
organisms: always taking in other assemblages in order to con-
tinue to turn those other assemblages into their own embodi-
ments and always being eaten by other assemblages. Think of 
the process of photosynthesis, which is the process of our very 
breath becoming the breath of plants, which then capture the 
energy of the sun and become the source of food for most life 
on the planet. Or, we might think of our elemental relationship 
to all other life on the planet and to the elements forged out of 
exploding stars in the universe (Macauley 2010). Or, we might 
take the Human Microbiome project into consideration, which 
suggests that non-human cells outnumber human cells in our 
bodies by a factor of 10. Our individual bodies then, might be 
thought of as many unique manifestations of bio-historical as-
semblages encountering other assemblages in the world. Our 
own (and other) manifest assemblages only exist and dwell “for 
a time,” before being taken in completely by other manifest as-
semblages. From this perspective we live in the thick of things, 
not on some individualized linear path that moves from birth 
to death. There are many historical human models for helping 
to think ourselves back into our animality and embededdness.
Third and finally, then, we can think queer ecology through 
the historical examples of tricksters, magicians and shamans, 
and radical faeries. Tricksters, of course, are meant to blur the 
boundaries between right and wrong, life and death, male and 
female, humans and animals, and humans and the divine. They 
do this in order to keep the world from becoming ossified into 
any given human, located perspective. Much like Latour’s col-
lective mentioned above, they help break open the collective, 
or, in Butlerian terms, they help us to pay attention to the ab-
jects and remainders of any given concept, idea, culture, so-
cial norm, etc. In a different way, magicians and shamans also 
play a role in dealing with the abject: they often see what is left 
unseen and work to bridge spirit/imagination with the mate-
rial world in combinations that seem unbelievable to everyday 
reason. Combining trickster figures, magicians, and shamans 
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with nature loving queers is, finally, the radical faerie commu-
nity. This organization was founded in 1979 and is made up of 
chapters all over the world. Some of the radical faeries live in 
nudist communes, while others live in urban areas. The point of 
them is to find alternative, often more environmental friendly, 
ways of living together outside of the model of hetero-capitalist 
production. Like tricksters and shamans, there are often drugs 
associated with radical faerie rituals and events. They have also 
created offshoots such as the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence, a 
group of cross-dressing S&M nuns who help promote safe sex 
and sex-positive messages. The point here is that if we are to 
develop a queer ecology, we must include different relations 
between bodies within that ecology, including our own. Queer 
bodies have often been marked as different, and sometimes as 
“unnatural,” while at the same time being closer to “nature” in 
the hierarchy of beings (Gaard 1997). This positionality, like that 
of the shaman and trickster, allows queer bodies more chances 
to think about different possibilities for becoming, despite all 
recent efforts to co-opt queerness into the institution of mar-
riage. Here, at the end of this chapter, it would be appropriate to 
think about what queer hopes and dreams for a planetary future 
might look like. 
Queer Hopes and Queer Dreams
Here at the rough edges of this chapter, I want to suggest that 
one of the major ways we get locked into efficiency, instrumen-
tality, heteronormativity, and linear understandings of time and 
progress is that our hopes and dreams have even been captured 
by the lure of narratives of progress and success that flow from 
these characteristics. This is why Halberstam, again, argues for 
the queer art of failure; failing, in a hetero-patriarchal society 
may be just what we need to think anew about what it is we 
are doing (2011). Might it be the case that we have been duped 
by our fossil-fueled and nuclear-fueled realities into imagining 
and desiring hopes and dreams for the future that are literally 
out of this world (Nixon 2011)? In other words, if our worlds 
have been structured into narratives of progress that through 
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efficient causality and instrumental reason, turn all of life into 
fodder for certain human’s progress, then haven’t our desires, 
hopes, and dreams been distorted toward creating this reality? 
Willis Jenkins in his recent book argues that we need to reform 
our desires in ways that help “make existing economic assem-
blages work against impoverishment” and for real wealth (Jen-
kins 268). Accordingly we ought not deny our desire for more, 
but channel those desires into using wealth to create a more eco-
logically viable and just world. In the spirit of such reformation, 
I want to end here with some reflections on planetary hopes and 
dreams. What can we hope for in a world of uncertainty, of am-
biguous relationality, and of evolving assemblages?
Timothy Morton, in an article on queer ecology, talks about 
how to care for the strange stranger (2010). In a sense, this is the 
type of ethics we need in relation to future others; the strange 
stranger is never the neighbor and will never become the neigh-
bor. The strange stranger is the self as well as other humans, 
animals, plants, and minerals. Dealing with strange strangers 
cannot involve the complete and total knowing implied by ef-
ficiency and instrumentality, rather, it must involve a bit of un-
knowing: it must involve adaptability and versatility. We must 
leave spaces for new possibilities to emerge (Keller 2014). Pos-
sibilities that we cannot yet imagine from where we are in the 
process of our assembling will emerge through the proliferation 
of ideas, connections, failures, and hopes and dreams we co-
create with the rest of the planetary community (past, present, 
and future). Our ancestors really are here with us in this process, 
as are future generations of life the exact nature of which we 
cannot even fathom. We need hopes and dreams that are not 
“out of this world” but that are of, for, and with this world. We 
need technologies for the planet, not just for human beings. We 
need mechanisms that transgress our current boundaries for 
living even if we are not certain of the goals toward which we are 
working. As we transgress boundaries, perhaps a better marker 
of progress will not be economic or material per se, but through 
how those transgressions ripple out and effect other planetary 
bodies. Such a mapping will enable us to adapt our ethics to 
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changing needs and to be versatile in the employment of our 
ethics given the needs that arise in a specific evolving situation. 
Adaptability and versatility rather than “sticking to your princi-
ples” or “maintaining coherence,” may perhaps be the grounds 
for principles we need for new ways of becoming that recognize 
just how queer this planetary process is. 
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Queer Green Sex Toys
Timothy Morton
Queer 
It is perfectly possible to defy the law of noncontradiction. Like 
Humpty Dumpty, we should try to believe at least six impossible 
things before breakfast. It is cognitively healthy and ontologi-
cally accurate. Indeed, to say You can’t think impossible things is, 
curiously, to have thought impossible things (Priest 2014)! 
Within normative Western logics, contradiction is perceived 
to be either evil or absurd, or some combination of both. But 
contradiction is everywhere, and it leaks out the strongest when 
we try to lock it down the strongest. I take this to be a symp-
tom of reality, which I take to be contradictory. In particular, 
ecological reality is contradictory, and if we humans want to go 
about “saving,” “preserving” or as I’d prefer to say, curating it, we 
had better allow some things to contradict themselves or else. 
What do I mean? It is simply that ecological beings — a frog, 
an ecosystem, a symbiotic relationship — are intrinsically fuzzy. 
It is impossible to tell exactly where they start and stop without 
getting caught up in frustrating paradoxes. Consider the case 
of the frog. The frog consists of all kinds of parts that are not 
frogs — all kinds of organs that other life-forms also possess, 
and that derive from other life-forms. A frog is evidence of an 
evolutionary process that developed all kinds of life-forms and 
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organs without having frogs particularly in mind. Yet a frog is a 
frog, not an octopus or a toaster. But it is strictly impossible to 
tell exactly when a pre-frog starts to evolve into a frog proper. 
Indeed, the concept of propriety goes out of the window. There 
are no frogs, in a sense! And yet there are. They are evidently 
here, with their bulging eyes and tiny, squishy bodies. But “here” 
no longer means constantly present. 
There is no underlying frog essence, no precise frog telos. An 
Aristotle might say that frogs have this shape and are for this 
thing: they croak and they are for jumping, or something like 
that. But teleology is precisely what is unthinkable after Dar-
win. A swim bladder is not particularly “for” swimming, which 
is why it can evolve into a lung, which has nothing to do with 
swimming. Evolution science calls this process exaptation. 
Frogs are made of things that aren’t frogs. Yet they are frogs. 
In a nutshell this is exactly the logic that Darwin uses in The 
Origin of Species. In one sense there are no species, if we take 
things like frogs to be constantly presently “there” in some met-
aphysical way, all frog all the way down. Yet in another sense, 
frogs are not cats. This has to do with the inner dynamics of 
genetic mutation. It is strictly impossible to determine in ad-
vance what counts as a (“false”) monstrosity and what counts as 
a (“true”) variant. Mutations are both true and false at the same 
time; they are dialetheic, double-truthed. If we cleave tightly to 
the so-called Law of Noncontradiction, expounded in Section 
Gamma of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (it remains unproved), there 
is no such thing as mutation, as it involves contradiction. Quite 
a few contemporary scientific phenomena require us to relax 
our grip on this supposed law. But the case of ecological beings 
is particularly pressing in this regard. 
Now consider another kind of ecological being, a collection 
of other beings that we call by a single name, insofar as it consti-
tutes some kind of ecosystem or environment or biome (or what 
have you). Consider, for instance, a meadow. There are grasses 
and tiny flowers. Small rodents such as voles are creeping about. 
A wading bird moves from a river bank into the water. Insects 
hum in a tree. Now imagine that one is removing something 
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from the meadow, say a blade of grass. Is there still a meadow? 
Why yes. You remove another blade of grass. Is there still a 
meadow? Yes indeed. You continue, thousands and thousands 
of times. By definition, the same logic applies at each step: the 
answer to the question Is there still a meadow? will always be yes. 
The trouble is, you have now removed all the grass and most 
of the rodents. The tree is slowly being taken apart, branch by 
branch and so on — and yet there is still a meadow, according 
to your logic. But there isn’t a meadow — so you conclude that 
there are no such things as meadows. Someone might as well 
build a parking lot right here, given that the meadow doesn’t 
really exist. You can also go in reverse, building up the meadow 
one blade of grass at a time, from a bare patch of ground. At 
every step, in this direction, you are able to say that there is no 
meadow, even up to the point where you have the voles and the 
insects and the creeping wading bird. I trust this serves to il-
lustrate the problem, which is also an ethical and political prob-
lem — a problem that has to ultimately do with metaphysics.
The reason for the logic that forces you to claim that there 
is still a meadow even when there is now a patch of plain soil, 
being blown away by the wind, is a certain metaphysics. Ac-
cording to this metaphysics, a thing exists if it is constantly 
present — this idea is known by Heidegger and Derrida as the 
metaphysics of presence. If we hold that ecological beings such 
as frogs and meadows must be constantly present, then we will 
rapidly “see” that they don’t exist at all. In that case, we might 
put our faith in something we do think is constantly present. 
Maybe frogs are just made of atoms, and atoms are real because 
they outlast things like frogs. Or maybe we can go in the other, 
“upwards” direction and argue that frogs are made of (human) 
perceptions of things we call frogs, or discourse, or Geist, or 
(human) economic relations, or Will, or Dasein. The first so-
lution is scientistic materialism — scientistic because science as 
such wisely abstains from wild metaphysical speculation. The 




Both scientistic materialism and correlationism and ide-
alism are solutions to something shocking first articulated by 
Immanuel Kant as he strove to underwrite Hume’s brilliant 
observation that we can’t point directly to causes and effects 
“underneath” phenomena, but instead can only see patterns 
and correlations in data and infer cause and effect from these 
patterns. Kant observed that there is a transcendental gap be-
tween what a thing is and how it appears, a gap that one cannot 
locate anywhere in given, perceptual, phenomenal, “ontic” (or 
what have you) space. There are raindrops, and they are wet, 
and they fall on my skin just so […] but when I look for the 
actual raindrop, all I find are raindrop data. Yet a raindrop is 
not a gumdrop. This is quite shocking, because it implies that a 
raindrop both is and is not itself at the same time — it is just how 
it appears (it’s not a gumdrop), yet it is never how it seems (it is 
not just its data) (Kant 1965, 84–85). 
Kant himself shied away from his intuition, preferring the 
idea that what makes the raindrop real is a transcendental sub-
ject capable of mathematizing the raindrop as an extensional 
lump (Heidegger, 1967). In short, Kant took refuge in an old 
scholastic, Aristotelian idea that at bottom, things are faceless 
lumps of extension decorated with accidents. Like Descartes, 
he thought he had passed beyond theological ontology. He also 
believed that he had transcended metaphysics altogether; phi-
losophy was now talking about data and reality, not about on-
tology at all. Yet because of his own shock at his own intuition, 
the Kantian solution to Kant’s discovery is the first in a series 
of regressive reactions to Humean skepticism, which is after all 
the philosophical basis of all modern science. Such regressive 
reactions as Hegel’s or the scientistic materialism I mentioned 
above try to contain the explosion of contradiction at the heart 
of the intuition that things are what they are but never as they 
seem. They try to contain contradiction by asserting something 
is more constantly present than the phenomena in question. 
These phenomena are made real by atoms, or by history, or by 
spirit, or what have you. And history or Will or atoms are more 
constantly present than the phenomena, which is why they get 
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to be the arbiter of reality, the “decider” that makes things real. 
When you consider it this way, the regressive reaction is a gi-
gantic case of passing the buck. We still haven’t considered how 
raindrops or meadows or frogs are real — which intuitively they 
are. The most basic fact about beings, the fact that they exist, 
remains a puzzle! 
And surely this is rather urgent when it comes to saving 
things like polar bears. If we can’t establish that polar bears ex-
ist, why bother saving them? Forget trying to prove that global 
warming exists. We can’t even prove polar bears exist, if we 
cleave to the metaphysics of presence. 
Enter queer theory. The powerful insight of queer theory 
is that at least one thing — gender — is performative. In other 
words, gender such as male or female is what it is, yet never ex-
actly as it seems. There are males, but not because something is 
metaphysically, constantly “there.” Maleness is a performance. 
If we simply extend this insight to life-forms, we discover a re-
markable and very satisfying fit between queer theory, ecology, 
and evolutionary theory. Evolution science is also claiming that 
some beings are performances; a duck looks and quacks enough 
like a duck, literally, to be able to pass on her or his genome, and 
that is the extent, and only the extent, to which she or he is a 
duck. This logic is identical to Alan Turing’s account of artificial 
intelligence; like gender, artificial intelligence is in the eye of the 
beholder — it is performative. Indeed, Turing’s opening analogy 
is someone trying to convince me, from behind a closed door, 
that he is a woman (Turing 1990). 
There is a tendency within saying that gender is performative 
towards correlationism, which as we have shown is saying that 
an observer or “decider” makes gender (or ducks or artificial 
intelligence) real. But this is not the central insight. The central 
insight is that in performance, it is impossible to know which 
part is true and which part is false. As Jacques Lacan succinctly 
puts it, “What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you don’t 
know whether it’s pretense or not” (Lacan 1981, 48).
If we are going to visualize the kind of entity that we could call 
queer, in general its topology would be that of a Möbius strip. It 
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is impossible to tell where the twist in the strip begins. It is, as 
it were, everywhere. The strip is a constant twisting. Likewise, it 
is impossible to tell where what a thing is stops and how a thing 
appears begins. They are intertwined in just the same way as the 
twist on a Möbius strip is everywhere. The strip doesn’t require 
an observer to perform its twistedness. It is always already a per-
formance of itself, to itself as it were. I experience this when I 
meditate, to the extent that I experience my mind as this kind of 
“object.” What is called mind is twisting back on itself such that 
its mode (whatever emotion it is experiencing, we might say) is 
not relevant to some task at hand but rather is simply how it ap-
pears at that moment. It doesn’t matter, in other words, whether 
I am feeling jealous or excited or whatever. That is simply how 
mind is performing at that point. But what this mind is, apart 
from these transient states, is a mystery. It is “there,” but inacces-
sible, like someone behind a door in the Turing Test. 
This bending of mind onto itself has often been associated, in 
certain strands of Western philosophy, with narcissism, which 
has in turn been associated with sexual queerness. But it is, I am 
arguing, a default state of being a thing at all: a pencil, a thought, 
an electron, a galaxy. 
Green
From the foregoing brief analysis, we can see that queerness, in 
part, implies what I here call green. What is green? Very simply 
it is the necessary interrelatedness of beings and the thinking of 
that interrelation: the ecological thought. 
Deeper even than that though, if such beings exist, they are 
intrinsically green, with or without relation. This is because they 
sub-vert (under-green?) the anti-ecological world that has been 
gathering in strength since the Neolithic and now threatens all 
life-forms with the Sixth Mass Extinction event. For the sake of 
brevity we shall call it Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia has an inner 
logic, an implicit set of thoughts about what it means to be a 
thing, and how to act accordingly. This inner logic, always im-
plicit and so reduced to the mechanical functioning of logistics, 
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churns away at the queerness of beings, necessarily violently, 
since the logistics insists on straightening out what cannot be 
straightened. 
Growing in strength since the Neolithic, despite the mother 
goddesses. 
From what is green distinguished? Green is the thought that 
begins to undermine our Mesopotamian reality. We are Meso-
potamians and most of our “world” religions originated in what 
is traditionally called the Axial Age, the age of post-Mesopota-
mian formalization of spiritualities. 
What is a Mesopotamian? A Mesopotamian is a vector for 
a certain virus. The virus is called agrilogistics. Agrilogistics is 
a compelling, logistical approach to agriculture that arose in 
rough synchrony around the world from about 12,000 years 
ago. The most successful approach was that practiced in Meso-
potamia, the Fertile Crescent, where to stabilize changing con-
ditions due to a changing climate, to reduce anxiety about the 
next meal — and an ontological anxiety concerning indigenous 
Trickster beings — some humans began to farm wheat and other 
crops, according to a program that enacted an implicit logic: a 
logistics. 
There are three axioms of agrilogistics. The first is Thou shalt 
not violate the law of noncontradiction. Since the law of non-
contradiction has never been formally proved, ever since it was 
formulated in Section Gamma of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, this 
axiom takes the form of a stern injunction. Strangely the injunc-
tion was in place long before Aristotle himself formalized it, be-
cause agrilogistics works by excluding (domesticated) lifeforms 
that aren’t part of your agrilogistical project. These lifeforms are 
now defined as pests if they scuttle about or weeds if they appear 
to the human eye to be inanimate and static. Such categories are 
hardly stable and extremely difficult to manage (Barbosa 1998).
It also results in the long history of the Easy Think Substance. 
Agrilogistical ontology, formalized by Aristotle 10,000 years in, 
thinks that a being consists of a bland lump of whatever, deco-
rated with accidents. It’s the Easy Think Substance because it 
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resembles what comes out of an Easy Bake Oven, which one 
subsequently decorates with sprinkles. 
If there are lots of people on a train heading over a cliff, it is 
ethical to switch the points to divert the train, even if the train 
runs over a single person stuck on the track onto which the train 
diverts. Only their number counts, the fact that they merely exist. 
Indeed, existing is better than any quality of existing, accord-
ing to what we will soon discover determines the third Axiom. 
It doesn’t even matter how many more people than one there 
are. Even the sheer quantity of existing is treated as a lump of 
whatever. Counting doesn’t count. For a social form whose early 
invention, writing, was so preoccupied with sheer counting (in 
surviving Linear B texts for instance), this is ironic. Say there 
were 300 people on the track, and 301 people in the train. The 
train should divert and run over the people on the track. More 
to the point, imagine seven billion people on the train, and a 
few thousand on the track. This represents the balance (or lack 
thereof) between the human species and a species about to go 
extinct because of human action. This isn’t even a fully math-
ematizable world, just a lump, an amazing pudding of stuff. 
So this implies Axiom (2): to exist is to be constantly present: 
the metaphysics of presence. The metaphysics of presence is inti-
mately caught in the history of global warming. Here is the field, 
I can plough it, sow it with this or that, or nothing, farm cattle, 
yet it remains, constantly the same. The entire system is con-
strued as constantly present, rigidly bounded, separated from 
nonhuman systems — despite the obvious existence of beings 
who show up to maintain it (for instance the cats and their help-
ful culling of rodents chewing at the corn) (Rosen 2013, Everd-
ing 2013, Driscoll 2014, Hu 2014).
The agrilogistical engineer must try to ignore the cats as best 
as he (underline he) can and, if that doesn’t work, kick them 
upstairs into deity status. Meanwhile, he asserts instead that he 
could plant anything in this agrilogistical field and underneath 
it remains the same field, constantly. A field is a substance un-
derlying its accidents. Agrilogistical space is a war against the 
accidental. Weeds and pests are a good example of something 
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supposedly accidental — a nasty accident you have to minimize 
or eliminate. As is said, a weed is a flower in the wrong place. 
Consider the accident of epidemics, commonly known in an-
cient Greek culture as miasma. The first hyperobject thinkable, 
yet not directly visible, to humans. Since you are settled and sta-
ble, you can observe these phenomena floating about. You see 
them as para, as accidental. And you try to get rid of them. For 
instance, you move to America and start washing your hands 
to get rid of germs. Then you suffer from an epidemic of polio, 
from which you were protected by not doing so much wash-
ing. This is the subject of Philip Roth’s novel Nemesis. Here is 
a good example of a strange loop. Agrilogistics itself actually 
works against itself, thus defying the law of noncontradiction 
in spite of itself! At least it is when you think it at an appropri-
ate ecological and geological timescale. Such is the global reach 
of agrilogistics; antibiotic-resistant bacteria may now be found 
throughout the biosphere: “in environmental isolates, soil DNA 
[…] secluded caves […] and permafrost,” in “arctic snow” and 
the open ocean (Nesme 2014).
To achieve constant presence, not just in thought but also 
in social and physical space requires persistent acts of violence, 
and such an achievement is itself violence (Derrida 2001, 162–
66). Why? Because it goes against the grain of (ecological) real-
ity, which consists of porous boundaries and interlinked loops, 
rather like the open-ended play of marks and signs that un-
derwrites the very scripts that underwrite agrilogistical space, 
with its neatly ploughed lines of words, many of their first lines 
pertaining to accounting for cattle — a lazy term for anything a 
(male) human owns. No, I’m not saying that pre-agrilogistical 
social forms were more present because they were oral. I’m say-
ing that they weren’t. Logocentrism — the idea that full presence 
is achievable within language — is an agrilogistical myth. This is 
why its deconstruction, in Heidegger and then in Derrida, is a 
way to start finding the exit route. 
Agrilogistical existing means just being there, in a totally un-
complicated sense. No matter what the appearances might be, 
essence lives on. Ontologically, agrilogistics is immiseration. 
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And socially, immiserating conditions were the almost immedi-
ate consequence of its inception, yet the virus persisted, like an 
earworm or a chair, no matter how destructive to the humans 
who had devised it (Diamond 1987, Parfit 1984, 1986, Agamben 
1998). Or indeed private property, based on settled ownership 
and use of land, a certain kind of house and so on — the nonhu-
man basis of the contemporary concept of self, no matter how 
much we want to think ourselves out of that. Agrilogistics led 
rapidly to patriarchy, the impoverishment of all but a very few, 
a massive and rigid social hierarchy, and feedback loops of hu-
man–nonhuman interaction, such as epidemics.1 Appearance, 
phenomena, are of no consequence. What matters is knowing 
where your next meal is coming from, no matter what the ap-
pearances are. The physical embodiment of this thought takes 
the form of fields that surround the city-state. These fields now 
underlie all other modes of production from feudalism to capi-
talism to Soviet economies. 
Without paying too much attention to the cats, you have bro-
ken things down to pure simplicity, and now you are ready for 
Axiom (3):
(3) Existing is always better than any quality of existing. 
Actually, we need to give it its properly anthropocentric 
form, because — screw the other life-forms, right? 
(3) Human existing is always better than any quality of ex-
isting. Axiom (3) generates an Easy Think Ethics to match the 
Easy Think Substance. A default utilitarianism, hardwired into 
agrilogistical space. Since existing is better than anything, more 
existing must be what we Mesopotamians should aim for. Eve-
rything else is just accidental. No matter whether I am hungrier, 
or sicker, or more oppressed, underlying these phenomena, I 
1 On the patriarchy aspect, insofar as it affects philosophy as such, Luce Iri-
garay is succinct: woman has been taken “quoad matrem […] in the entire 
philosophic tradition. It is even one of the conditions of its possibility. One 
of the necessities, also, of its foundation: it is from (re)productive earth-
mother-nature that the production of the logos will attempt to take away its 
power, by pointing to the power of the beginning(s) in the monopoly of the 
origin” (Irigaray 1985, 102). 
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and my brethren remain constantly, down the generations. The 
globalization of agrilogistics, and its consequent global warm-
ing, have exposed the flaws in this default utilitarianism, with 
the consequence that solutions to global warming simply can-
not be along the lines of this style of thought (Gardiner 2011, 
213–45). The predictable result: humans now consume about 
forty percent of Earth’s productivity (Manning 2004, 2005). Hu-
mans account for 32 percent of vertebrate biomass. Domesti-
cated animals count for 65 percent. Which means that less than 
3 percent go to vertebrate wildlife (Zalasiewicz 2013).
Jared Diamond has called Fertile Crescent agriculture “the 
worst mistake in the history of the human race” (Diamond 
1987). It’s worse than a mistake. Because of its underlying logi-
cal structure, agrilogistics now plays out at the temporal scale 
of global warming. Agrilogistics supplied the conditions for the 
Agricultural Revolution, which swiftly provided the conditions 
for the Industrial Revolution. Which is why there is a good re-
action to the “modernity once more with feeling” solutions to 
global warming — bioengineering, geoengineering, and other 
forms of what I shall call happy nihilism. Happy nihilism reduc-
es things to bland substances that can be manipulated at will, 
without regard to unintended consequences. The right reaction 
is a scream.
Planning for the next few years means you know where the 
next meal is coming from, for a long time. Who doesn’t want 
that? And existing is good, right? So let’s have more of it. Yes, 
I have just touched the third rail, the population rail. You are 
now thinking I might be a Nazi. Or that, given that we have seen 
population growth and food supply grow tougher, I am simply 
talking “nonsense” (Ellis 2013). Nonsense or evil. Courting these 
sorts of reactions is just one of the first ridiculous, impossible 
things that ecognosis does. So much ridicule, so little time. In-
deed, even more ridiculously perhaps, I shall argue that ecog-
nosis must traverse Heideggerian–Nazi space, descend below it 
even, through nihilism, and not despite it. 
It was based on increasing happiness: eliminating anxiety 
about where the next meal is coming from. But within the first 
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quarter of its duration so far, agrilogistics resulted in a dras-
tic reduction in happiness. People starved, which accounts for 
shocking decreases in average human size in the Fertile Cres-
cent. Within three thousand years, patriarchy emerged. Within 
three thousand years, what is now called the 1% emerged, or in 
fact the 0.1%, which in those days was called King. Agrilogistics 
exerted downward pressure on evolution. Within three thou-
sand years, farmers’ leg bones went from ripped hunter-gatherer 
to semi-sedentary forerunner of the couch potato. Let’s not for-
get deserts. Agrilogistics was already a disaster early on. It was 
repeated throughout Earth. There is a good Freudian term for 
this destructive repetition: death drive. 
Sex
The analysis of the implications of queer and green bring us 
to another term: sex. By sex this essay surely doesn’t mean ex-
clusively heterosexual reproduction and its heteronormative 
cultural spinoffs. Indeed, that form of reproduction floats, in 
evolution space, amidst a gigantic ocean of manifold forms of 
sexuality from cloning to gender switching to homosexuality. 
No: what is meant by sex is the uncontainable enjoyment with 
which queer green begins to resonate, once it is thought at a suf-
ficient amplitude. 
It is logically incorrect to imagine that things are just ex-
tensional lumps decorated with accidents, including temporal 
things. Things are better described as smeared, shimmering, 
flickering. It is also politically and ethically disastrous. Since it 
is logically incorrect and physically impossible, trying to im-
pose this ontology only results in violence. It is better to act as if 
things are as they were described in the “Queer” section: loop-
like beings whose appearance never quite coincides with what 
they are, yet is never other than evidence for what they are. An 
octopus is not a toaster. But the way in which it is an octopus is 
strangely twisted. A meadow is not a parking lot. Why act as if it 
could be reduced to one at any moment? 
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Psychologically, we are used to calling the twist of appearing 
and being a special word: enjoyment. Enjoyment is never exactly 
coincident with what I think I want — that is what is sometimes 
disturbing, sometimes wonderful about it. Enjoyment is never 
exactly mine, yet it embodies me to perfection — it is how I am 
wriggling at this precise moment, despite my concept of who 
I am. Enjoyment implies movement, and movement is deeply 
mysterious yet pervasive. It is everywhere, yet movement is one 
of the most difficult things to explain, unless you are prepared to 
violate the law of noncontradiction. 
Happily, objects violate this law all the time. In fact, that is 
just what they do when you observe them as carefully as pos-
sible, for instance when you isolate them from other entities by 
cooling them down towards absolute zero and putting them in 
a vacuum. When you do this to a tiny mirror, you will observe 
it emitting infrared light (Savafi-Naeini and Painter 2012). This 
emission is happening without the mirror being pushed. The 
mirror is shimmering without mechanical input. If you wanted 
to reduce the ontology of queer green sex toys to a single sen-
tence it would indeed be this: Things shimmer without mechani-
cal input. 
Perhaps it is anthropomorphic to say that everything is en-
joying, in the precise sense of deviating from itself while main-
taining its being, like a circle, a line that deviates from itself in an 
absolutely smooth and consistent way, or a twisted loop. But at 
this moment, a little anthropomorphism, if it helps us to think 
and join with nonhuman beings, might not be such a bad idea. 
Surely the idea that everything is enjoying is not anthropocentric, 
and of the two, I would prefer anthropomorphism to anthropo-
centrism any day. In a precise sense, perhaps I can never stop 
being anthropomorphic, because even when I am trying to do 
so, there I am, a human being, trying to do so — and perhaps my 
humanness is encapsulated precisely in my attempt sensitively 
to attune to things that are not me. My chameleon-like qualities, 
whether they come from mirror neurons or being born func-
tionally and drastically premature, or from some other source, 
are precisely what make me appear human. As Keats would ar-
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gue, poets are chameleons, and perhaps this is because being 
human is about melting into other things, as in how a shaman 
tries to become an antelope or a bear. 
Thinking of ourselves as sensitive attunement devices is per-
haps unfamiliar, given how we have recently been thinking of 
ourselves as “nihilistic princes of darkness” (Harman 2005, 247). 
But it follows quite logically from the fact that things are looped. 
It is impossible to achieve escape velocity from oneself. When 
one tries — there you are, doing that. There is no ultimate police-
man to arrest all the other policemen and the other characters 
in Monty Python’s Argument Sketch for violating the rules of 
sketches, because every policeman who shows up is still operat-
ing within the Argument Sketch (Cleese and Chapman 1972). 
Or to put it in dressier terms, there is no metalanguage that 
cannot be turned into an object language. For instance, I can 
be disturbed by self-reference, like Bertrand Russell. And like 
Alfred Tarski I can invent a concept called metalanguages to po-
lice self-referential sentences such as This sentence is false, a loop 
sentence that is both true and false at the same time. The trouble 
is, a cheeky trickster philosopher can come along and bend the 
metalanguage into a yoga-like pretzel of self-reference. The met-
alanguage says “This sentence is false is not a sentence.” But the 
trickster philosopher can then say This is not a sentence, which 
is even “worse” and weirder — more tightly twisted — than This 
sentence is false, because now the sentence is denying its very 
sentence-being, not just what it is saying. 
Like bacteria adapting to antibacterial soap — and there is a 
tight link between such feedback loops and the logical loops I 
am describing — sentences escape the law of noncontradiction 
and wriggle around themselves all the time. We experience en-
joyment as a disturbing parasite that is joined to me inextricably 
yet transcends me at the same time. Enjoyment and myself exist 
in a weird symbiosis, like a lichen or indeed like my bacterial 
microbiome. An ecological being such as a meadow or a polar 
bear or the entire biosphere is precisely a paradoxical being that 
exceeds itself without not-being itself. An ecological being is a 
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constantly twisting deviation that is none other than it appears. 
This is because everything is like that. 
A thing is a loop, and another way of saying that is that a 
thing is penetrating itself such that the tail and head end of a 
thing become impossible to distinguish, as in the ancient idea 
of the ouroboros. A thing is having sex with itself, let alone with 
other beings. It is just that we have tended in Western philoso-
phy and religion — let alone left cultural critique — to denigrate 
this basic phenomenon as narcissism. But as Jacques Derrida ar-
gues, there is not narcissism and non-narcissism, there are only 
various narcissisms: 
There is not narcissism and non-narcissism; there are narcis-
sisms that are more or less comprehensive, generous, open, 
extended. What is called non-narcissism is in general but the 
economy of a much more welcoming, hospitable narcissism 
[…] without a movement of narcissistic reappropriation, the 
relation to the other would be absolutely destroyed, it would 
be destroyed in advance. (Derrida 1995, 199)
Likewise in the spirituality systems that reside in the strangely 
cordoned off VIP lounges of Axial Age religions — agrilogisti-
cal religions that is — there is some notion of self-existing, 
self-looping wisdom such as the Hindu or Buddhist jnana or 
the Christian gnosis (terms that stem from the same root). As 
Jeffrey Kripal asserts, gnosis is thinking having sex with itself: 
thought in a loop (Kripal 2006, 125). Thought in a state of devi-
ant enjoyment. The most basic thought, thought in a vacuum 
close to absolute zero as it were, is a shimmering without me-
chanical input that could otherwise be described as a looping. 
And just as sex evolved chronologically before humans and an-
telopes — and indeed daisies and oak trees — there is something 
ontologically fundamental about the category of sex. Things are 




What are these queer, green sex beings? They are toys. Toys are 
contingent. Toys are fragile. Toys are connective. And most sig-
nificantly, toys are playful. To play is to violate the law of non-
contradiction. When my cat nips me, she is saying This is a bite 
and this is not a bite at the same time (Bateson 2000). Appar-
ently my cat is more relaxed than some humans about logical 
laws that have never been proved. Play is already implied by the 
paraconsistent logic of allowing some things to violate the law of 
noncontradiction — a violation that a growing number of logi-
cians are willing to tolerate, and which quantum theorists must 
tolerate all the time (Priest 2006). 
The “sexuality” of a thing, how it shimmers without mechan-
ical input, looped into itself in a pretzel logic that looks to some 
like narcissism, is an index of its contingency and fragility. Even 
the most powerful object in the universe, a black hole, that can-
not be destroyed by anything else, is fragile in the sense that its 
deviation from itself eventually eats itself up: it emits enough 
Hawking radiation and evaporates. Things are impermanent in 
their very selves, not because they are bland extensional plastic 
lumps waiting for some bigger, badder lump to blow them away. 
Coexistence, which is an open word for ecological being, is a 
state in which entities allow one another to be fragile in just this 
way. To be toys. 
Any system of interrelated beings — an ecosystem for in-
stance — is contingent and fragile too. It is also a toy. This means 
that no ecological action can be complete or absolutely correct. 
If I am nice to bunny rabbits, it means I’m not being nice to 
bunny rabbit parasites. The critical game of spot the hypocrite, 
which has been the most popular way of performing intelli-
gence in modernity, is now obsolete in an age of growing eco-
logical awareness, because it simply cannot function — there is 
no cynical position that is not immune from the hypocrisy of 
being unable to account for absolutely everything, precisely be-
cause as we have seen there is no pure, clean metalanguage. It is 
just as the post-structuralists thought, only more so — not only 
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epistemologically, but ontologically. We cannot totalize because 
beings are never complete in themselves, whether or not we are 
thinking them. 
Thus an age of ecological ethics and politics cannot impose 
a top-down, one-size-fits-all, political or economic system. It 
would be ontologically impossible and thus violent to try to do 
so. That has been what is wrong with agrilogistics; whether so-
viet or capitalist or feudal (or any other number of economic 
systems), agrilogistics implies one system to rule them all, a nar-
row temporality pipe made of grey concrete that gradually sucks 
all life-forms into its destructive orbit. Humans need to create 
as many temporality pipes as possible, as many affiliations of 
humans and nonhumans as possible. Ecological politics is more 
like anarchism than any other political modality. 
There is no absolute space, no neutral, universal container 
into which everything can fit. Indeed, it is this concept, not the 
idea of place, that is the anthropocentric one. The Newtonian 
idea of time and space as an absolute, linear container made of 
atomic spatiotemporal parts is a good-enough-to-be-getting-
along-with, human scale tool useful if you want to plough a field 
or invade Poland. But if you want to slingshot around a black 
hole or be nice to bunny rabbits, the idea of space is absolutely 
useless. It would be better instead to de-anthropocentrize the 
idea of place. Rather than considering place as some pathetic 
human-flavored candy decorating a bland extensional world of 
atomic spatiotemporal components, it would be best to consider 
place as the weird way in which an object deviates from itself. 
An object emits place, like an octopus emitting ink, or a star 
emitting light, or like the way in which I am surrounded and 
permeated by a bacterial microbiome in such a way that there 
is actually more bacterial DNA than Timothy Morton DNA — as 
a structural condition for Timothy Morton existing at all. Eco-
logical awareness is just the creeping realization that everything 
has or emits place, not just humans. The biosphere is its own 
place, and we inhabit our place inside it. What is disturbing is 
that place is no longer a cozy human construct at all, one that 
we can cherish nostalgically or primitivistically, or laugh at con-
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temptuously for being out of date. Place is just another way of 
saying that things play. 
Thinking ecologically has nothing to do with normative pu-
rity or nature discourses in which things never deviate from 
themselves and in which loops such as desire are evil. Think-
ing ecologically precisely means thinking that things are queer 
green sex toys. 
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